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Abstract 
This thesis presents and investigates a theory of entrepreneurship based on the Austrian 
School of Economics. By using a different theoretical framework than that of conventional 
economics we deduce a holistic theory of entrepreneurship and seek to explain other 
economic phenomena, such as the emergence of firms and business cycles, on the basis of 
this. We also suggest implications this new theory has for micro-economic models, 
management theory and public policy. We find that the Austrian School of Economics helps 
shed light on many phenomena that are poorly elaborated upon by conventional economics.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1   Research questions 
 
Our objective is to use the framework of Austrian economics to shed light on the field of 
entrepreneurship in the context of a market economy. Austrian economics puts 
entrepreneurship at the helm of the market economy. We hope to answer the following two 
questions: 
 
1. Can Austrian economic theory help us understand entrepreneurship better than 
conventional economic theory?  
2. Does Austrian theory have implications for how we understand business management 
and the role of public policy?  
 
1.2   Background information 
 
The limping economies of the west are a great concern and there is reason to be weary. In 
Europe, nationalism is on the rise. Both left and right wing politicians, even economists, 
doubt the free market system, blaming it for the current mess many economies find 
themselves in.  At the same time, emerging economies are presenting impressive GDP 
growth, even those with totalitarian rule (e.g. China).    
However, a quick look at some statistics reveals a different story. Figure 1.1 shows the top 
ten and bottom ten countries as measured by the Index of Economic Freedom and their 
respective scores on the Global Innovation Index. The global innovation index measures 
several elements which enables an economy to support innovative activities.  
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Figure  1.1 Global Innovation Index and Index of Economic Freedom.1 
Although a clear pattern seems to emerge there are those countries that have high scores in 
economic freedom, but remains low on innovation. In this particular case these are Chile and 
Mauritius. This suggests that there are more to innovation than economic freedom. That said, 
it still seems freer economies are more innovative economies.  
Another sensible statistic to take a look at is economic freedom compared to GDP per capita. 
Figure 1.2 shows the Index of Economic Freedom along the horizontal axis and GDP per 
capita (adjusted for PPP) along the vertical axis.  
 
 1.2 GDP per Capita (PPP) and Economic freedom. Source: www.heritage.org 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 
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Figure 1.2 indicates a connection between GDP per capita and economic freedom. However, 
there remains the problem of countries’ different histories. A country may have had a high 
economic freedom score for a short time and, thus, it will still have a low GDP per capita. 
We might look at GDP growth rates to better elucidate the impact of economic freedom, but 
there remains the problem of the post 2008 financial crisis impact and government debt 
problems of many economically free countries distorting these numbers. Furthermore, GDP 
is not necessarily a good measure for an economy’s well being.  
The often proposed solution to the economic problems of the west is increases in 
government spending to jump start the economy. A quick look at the statistics suggests that 
this might not be a good idea. Figure 1.3 shows 5 year GDP growth rate along the vertical 
axis and the government expenditures as percent of GDP along the horizontal axis. There 
seems to be some negative correlation between government expenditures and growth rate. 
Considering the vastly different economies constituting the whole selection it might be more 
interesting to have a look at a more narrow selection of more similar countries. 
 
 1.3 5-year compounded growth rate and Government expenditures.Source: 
www.heritage.org 
Figure 1.4 shows government expenditures as percent of GDP and 5 year growth rate, but 
only for European countries. The tendency is clearer this time.   
 11 
 
 1.4 5-year growth rate and Government Spending, Europe. Source: www.heritage.org 
It seems large government sectors acts as a burden on the economy, displacing the profit and 
loss system of the private sector with a bureaucratic one instead. However, it must be 
pointed out that the data which these analyses are based on are aggregates which may or may 
not lack vital information depending on country. One example is China with a modest 
government expenditure of 24 per cent of GDP and a 5-year compound annual growth rate 
of 9,3% (The Heritage Foundation). This looks convincing if one does not take into account 
that gross capital formation constitutes more than 45 % of China’s GDP and one recognizes 
the debt fueled real estate bubble in China (The World Bank, n.d.). We will not delve into 
why it is so; suffice to say, utilizing such data to make economic policy would have dire 
consequences.  
Although none of these statistics are conclusive in any way, they all tell a similar story. Freer 
economies perform better. The lack of a good measures for real economic progress makes 
these statistics superficial, yet they convey a clear message in our opinion. Although highly 
stylized, we contend that this is as good as it gets with economic statistics.   
So why is it that the freer economies of the west seem stuck in second gear? We suspect a 
general ignorance of the workings of the market economy is to blame, in particular the 
understanding of entrepreneurship and free enterprise as the driving force of the economy. In 
other words; the theory is to blame.  
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The field of entrepreneurship is one that has gained increased attention in the last few 
decades. The increased understanding of entrepreneurship as a fundamental part of the 
market economy and of economic growth has led to this development. We now hear 
politicians talk warmly of entrepreneurs and the gründer-spirit as essentialities of the 
economy. However, we contend that the concept of entrepreneurship is one poorly defined in 
both conventional micro- and macroeconomics, and is subject to a multitude of 
interpretations. The phenomenon in question, when speaking of entrepreneurship, is not 
entirely clear either. Not having a holistic and coherent approach to the real and equilibrating 
forces of the market economy is problematic and can lead economists and policy makers 
astray in their endeavor to “fix” poorly performing economies.  
One school of economic thought helps us shed light on this phenomenon, more so than 
others. The Austrian school of economics, with its “micro-based macro-view”, gives us a 
bottom up explanation of the market economy. Individual human action as a starting point 
for economic analysis makes room for a broad theory of entrepreneurship as the driving 
force of economic growth.  
 
1.3   Methodology 
 
Our analysis is a theoretical one, building on the theories of the Austrian school of 
economics, which we find best suited to explain entrepreneurship. We base much of our 
analysis on the interpretation of entrepreneurship proposed by Foss and Klein (2012). We 
also include insights from non-Austrians such as erank Knight’s views on uncertainty and 
profits, and Ronald Coase’s work on explaining the formation of firms. At the center of our 
analysis will be the Austrian notion of an intertemporal structure of heterogeneous capital.  
Otherwise our analysis will be inspired by the methodological approach of the Austrian 
school, as outlined by Mises (1949/1996), also referred to as the causal-realist tradition.  
This approach is said to be causal in that it seeks to explain purposeful human action and 
economic phenomena in terms of Aristotelian notion of cause and effect, and realist in that it 
attempts to explain real world situations rather than hypothetical ones (The Ludwig von 
Mises Institute (c), n.d.).   
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By relying on the causal-realist approach and the works of other economists, we hope to 
make a logically coherent contribution to the field of theoretical micro-economics.  
 
1.4   Scope and limitations  
 
Our emphasis will be on explaining the role of entrepreneurship as an essential part of the 
market economy. We hope to help the reader see the economy through the entrepreneur’s 
eyes. By combining Austrian capital theory with theories of entrepreneurship, our aim is to 
explain economic phenomena, such as firm creation and price formation, as a result of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Regarding Austrian economic theory, our aim is not to prove or disprove its validity. We 
merely use the Austrian school as a theoretical toolbox to better outline the role of the 
entrepreneur in the market economy. We therefore assume its basic theories to be valid.  
Furthermore, we will limit our analysis to the theoretical realm, only using statistics were 
easily applicable. We try here to outline a new Austrian inspired take on entrepreneurship 
and micro-economic theory. Its validity should be subject for criticism and testing. Our 
mission is to provide the test subject.  
 
1.5   Structure 
 
Fearing that many economists are poorly acquainted with Austrian economic theory, we start 
by giving the reader an introduction to Austrian School economics. We find it necessary to 
devote a good number of pages for this purpose, if readers unfamiliar with Austrian 
economics are to comprehend our analysis.  
After giving the reader an introduction to basic Austrian theory, we continue with an 
analysis of entrepreneurship in chapter 3 and in chapter 4 we investigate the phenomenon of 
firm creation and offer a revision of the microeconomic model of the firm.  
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In chapter 5 we investigate business management from the perspective of our discussions in 
chapter 3 and 4.  
In chapter 6 we make our general conclusions.   
 
2. The Austrian school of economics 
2.1   History  
 
It is worthwhile to review the history of the Austrian School before we elaborate on its 
theories. To distinguish the Austrian school from mainstream economics can in many cases 
be difficult due to the many overlapping areas. Here we wish to clarify the Austrian School 
as a distinct tradition in the field of economics, building on its own theories different from 
those of mainstream economics.  
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, there emerged many conflicting schools of 
economic thought in Western Europe; The German Historical School and The Austrian 
School were two of them. The German Historical School sought to explain economic 
phenomena through the study of economic history while the Austrian school contended that 
economic knowledge arises from theoretical analysis (Taylor, 1980). Carl Menger (1840-
1921), the first great Austrian, sparked off what has been know as the Methodenstreit in 
1883 with his book “Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special 
Reference to Economics” (Hülsmann, 2005).  
Earlier in his career, Carl Menger had produced a theory of value which resolved the 
question of price that for so long had perplexed the great classical economists. This theory 
was based on subjective value and the principle of marginal utility (Taylor, 1980). We will 
discuss this theory more in later sections. Austrian economists Friedrich von Wieser (1851-
1926) and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914), disciples of Carl Menger, took on the task 
of refining Menger’s theories, applying them to costs, interest and capital theory (ibid).  
Ludwig Von Mises (1881-1973) and Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), students of Böhm-
Bawerk and Wieser respectively, continued their predecessors work. In 1912, Mises solved 
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the problem of applying marginal utility theory to money in Theory of Money and Credit. In 
Socialism (1921) Mises demonstrates the unworkable nature of socialism due to its lack of 
private ownership of capital goods and market prices. In 1949 he published his magnum 
opus Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, where he devotes much space to the 
epistemological and methodological foundation of economics as a science. Hayek became 
famous after being invited to the London School of Economics in 1931, where he quarreled 
with John Maynard Keynes over monetary policy, business cycles and public spending 
programs as a way to prosperity.  
The Austrian school had, for reasons we won’t elaborate on here, started to die out during 
the 1920s. This trend continued in the 1930’s and the Austrian school more or less died out 
after Hayek’s decision not to write a response to Keynes’ 1936 publication The Genereal 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (North, 2010).  
Furthermore, the onset of world war two made massive government intervention in the 
economy necessary, allowing big government proponents to test out their ideas of a planned 
economy. After the war, the Keynesian interventionist paradigm had come to stay. However, 
both Mises and Hayek continued their work after the war, although with different focus. 
Hayek devoted his attention less to economic theory and focused on political theory. Mises 
on the other hand continued his work, refining the Austrian theories in books such as Human 
Action (1949) and Bureaucracy (1944). Mises had also decided to immigrate to the United 
States in 1940 where he worked as a visiting professor until his retirement in 1969. During 
this period Mises had the fortune to inspire a new generation of Austrian economists, most 
notably Murray N. Rothbard (1926 – 1995) and Israel Kirzner (Azad, 2005, p. 6).  
Murray Rothbard made major contributions to Austrian economic theory, building upon the 
works of Ludwig von Mises. He wrote his own treatise on economics called Man, Economy 
and State in 1962 where he made many new contributions to Austrian theory. Israel Kirzner 
is well known for his research into entrepreneurship.  
Of course, there have been many Austrian economists through the ages not mentioned by us, 
but we have to limit this section to include the most notable ones. Today, the majority of the 
Austrian school is focused around the Ludwig Von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, and 
the George Mason University, Virginia, USA.   
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2.2  Methodology of the Austrian School 
 
The Austrian School is most clearly separated from mainstream economics by its 
methodological foundations (Hoppe, 2006). Since the time of Carl Menger, the Austrian 
school economists have viewed economics not as an empirical science, but one based on 
logic deductive theorizing over economic phenomena. Carl Menger’s conception of 
economic theory was “essentialist”, seeking to discover the essence of economic 
relationships. Menger sought to discover “exact” laws governing economic phenomena. 
These were not laws of mathematical precision, “…but laws which follow necessarily from 
the essential nature of the factors involved, and thus are invariably true regardless of time 
and place” (White, 1977, p. 7).  
For Menger and Böhm-Bawerk the scarcity of resources along with the human desire for 
ever greater satisfaction determined the essential structure of the economic world (ibid). This 
method of finding economic truth simply by thinking about economic phenomena set these 
early Austrians apart from their more mathematically oriented contemporaries (e.g. Léon 
Walras, Gustav von Schmoller). Indeed, the issue of apriorism and the scientific validity of 
Menger’s “exact” laws is still much debated and attacked by economists today.   
The methodological foundations of the Austrian school were further developed by Mises in 
his book Human Action (1949). Mises views economics as the most developed part of a 
more universal science of human action, praxeology. Praxeology is the deductive study of 
human action based on the axiom that humans engage in purposeful behavior rather than 
reflexive behavior. Purposeful behavior implies that humans engage in acts of choice which 
again implies that humans have preferences.  
“No treatment of economic problems proper can avoid starting from acts of choice; economics 
becomes a part, although the hitherto best elaborated part, of a more universal science, praxeology” 
(Mises, 1949/1996, p. 3) 
Furthermore, Mises prefers the term Catallactics to describe that part of praxeology dealing 
with human action in a market exchange context. That is, what most people think of as 
economics is just at branch of economics, Catallactics. Since everything that happens in the 
market place is a result of human action, any study of the market phenomena must begin 
with consideration about human action. Mises holds that any deliberate human action “…is 
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motivated by the urge to remove a felt uneasiness” (Mises, 1949/1996, p. 232). Man then 
chooses what means he himself regards as most fit to achieve his chosen ends. Economics as 
a science is not interested in why people choose certain ends, but merely that they do and 
how this brings about action resulting in exchange and price formation. 
It does not matter for the science of action how people qualify this uneasiness from a 
physiological, psychological or ethical point of view. It is the task of economics to deal with 
all commodity prices as they are really asked and paid in market transactions. (Mises, 
1949/1996, p. 232)   
Mises’ praxeology is a purely aprioristic system of economic theory without any 
psychological considerations, providing only logical sanction for economic law (White, 
1977, p. 13). It is clear that Mises attempted to establish economics, or praxeology, as a 
separate science from psychology and sociology. Mises holds that “…economics as a 
science is not concerned with the motives behind human actions but only the implications of 
action itself” (ibid. p.13).  
The main controversy over the Austrian School is its reliance on axioms and deductive 
reasoning instead of empirical research and hypothesis testing. Mises’ praxeology rests upon 
aprioristic axioms not dependent on experience and not falsifiable through statistical method. 
From these axioms the field of economics is deduced through simple reasoning. This might 
at first sound unscientific, but Mises defends his views thoroughly.  
The real thing which is the subject matter of praxeology, human action, stems from the same source 
as human reasoning. Action and reason are congeneric and homogenous; they may even be called 
two different aspects of the same thing. That reason has the power to make clear through pure 
ratiocination the essential features of action is a consequence of the fact that action is an offshoot of 
reason. The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and 
incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover with the full rigidity of 
their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. 
Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things. (Mises, 1949/1996, p. 39)  
It is worth pointing out that Mises dismisses all sorts of polylogism, claiming that all 
reasoning is guided by the same logic and this is the same for all humans. Different 
conclusion regarding the same problem must therefore stem from differences in premises, 
knowledge and preferences. Thus, it is possible to deduce exact laws through logic deductive 
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reasoning as long as one does not pass value judgments. To Mises, an African tribesman 
performing a rain dance is not irrational. The tribesman has simply chosen what means best 
serves his ends on the basis of his limited knowledge of natural phenomena. The tribesman 
has acted rationally. Only when an onlooker, educated in the workings of the natural 
phenomena, judges the tribesman’s action according to his own standard, does it makes 
sense to talk about irrationality.  
The methodological approach of the Austrian School differs from that of mainstream 
economics. It is recognized by skepticism towards statistical analysis and mathematical 
models, noting that “…economic phenomena are necessarily discontinuous and discrete” 
(White, 1977, p. 10) Building on the human action axiom (people act intent on removing felt 
uneasiness) they seek to uncover cause-effect relationships in economic phenomena.  
It is worth noting that the Austrian School does not disregard statistics as useful, but merely 
takes economic statistics for what it is. Economic statistics is historical data, not 
experimental data and to apply methods designed for natural experiments to historic data can 
never yield the kind of laws we get from the natural sciences.  In fact “the interpretation of 
statistics and other historical data presupposes praxeological knowledge in isolating causal 
relationships and grouping related events” (White, 1977, p. 15). Economic aggregates are 
also frowned upon amongst Austrian School economists. The strict methodological 
individualism characterizing the Austrian School calls for disaggregation and the study of 
the economy’s smallest parts, its human actors, and not mathematically constructed 
aggregates of past human actions. 
  
2.3   The subjective theory of value 
 
As mentioned earlier, Carl Menger developed a price theory which explained the price 
problem which had perplexed the classical school economists of 18
th
 and 19
th
 century. Such 
questions as why diamonds are more expensive than water, despite their limited use value 
for humans, were at the core of this debate. Menger rejected the notion that value was “an 
objective measure intrinsic in the good itself” or determined by cost of production (Taylor, 
1980, p. 8). He claimed that value was based on individual human wants, placing “… human 
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beings at the center of economics” (Salerno, 2012b). Subjective valuation is the starting 
point of all economic activity, a necessity for exchange to make sense. Menger’s theory also 
explained how value or prices are imputed backwards from final goods (consumption goods) 
to capital goods (producer goods). That is, the value of a capital good or resource is 
determined by its discounted marginal revenue product (DMRP).  
The theory of subjective value is today not limited to the Austrian School, but it’s more 
strictly interpreted by Austrian economists.  
Carl Menger was also one of three economists developing the theory of marginal utility. 
Menger, Léon Walras and William Stanley Jevons all developed theories of marginal utility 
independently, but roughly at the same time (Hülsmann, 2005). Carl Menger’s theory of 
marginal utility differs from the modern interpretation; strictly abiding to ordinal rankings of 
units of goods, not measuring utility in “utils” or employing mathematical formula to explain 
the concept
2
. This way of perceiving marginal utility is clearly connected to a strict 
interpretation of subjective value. There is no way of objectively measuring value, so two 
individuals’ perceived value cannot be compared. This leaves such concepts as public utility 
meaningless to the Austrian tradition. In Carl Menger’s words:  
not only the nature but also the measure of value is subjective. Goods always have value to certain 
economizing individuals and this value is also determined only by these individuals. (Menger, 1871, 
2007, p. 147)  
The combination of subjective value theory and marginal utility stands at the core of 
Austrian economic theory.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For a thorough explanation of the Austrian marginal utility theory see J. Huston McCulloch paper from 1977 available at 
https://mises.org/etexts/McCulloch.pdf. 
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2.4   The time-preference theory of interest 
 
Another central aspect of the Austrian School is it emphasis on time in economic processes. 
Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital and interest made the link between the extended and 
indirect production processes and the phenomenon of interest (Taylor, 1980). Böhm-Bawerk 
argued that people prefer present good to future goods of the same characteristics under strict 
ceteris paribus conditions. This assumption explains the margin between selling price and 
costs and “the margin which goes to the capitalist supplying the funds needed for 
intermediate products or capital goods” (Taylor, 1980, p. 9). Thus the return which the 
capitalist makes on his investment is a compensation for his deferred consumption.  
In later times, Böhm-Bawerk’s theory has been known as the pure time-preference theory of 
interest. The theory contends that the basis for the phenomena of interest is people’s time 
preference. The result of people’s time preference is what is known as the pure rate in 
Austrian theory. Of course, market rates always contain a risk premium, even those which 
are usually regarded as risk free. Risk and uncertainty can never be eliminated completely, 
which also means that this pure rate of interest can never be measured. Murray Rothbard 
(1962/2001) suggests decomposing the market rate in the following way.  
Market rate = time preference component + entrepreneurial component + PPM component + 
Terms-of-trade component 
The pure rate is, as described above, the result of people’s time preference and tends to be 
uniform throughout the economy. The entrepreneurial component differs from firm to firm 
and consists of the rate investors must anticipate in advance regarding a specific investment. 
Thus a particularly risky investment will tend to earn a higher net return, if successful, than 
what is generally perceived as a “safe” investment. The PPM component relates to changes 
in the purchasing power of money and expectations thereof. This element is ephemeral so the 
more that changes in the PPM are anticipated, the less important this element will be since 
the change itself will be more rapid (Rothbard, 1962/2001, p. 697).  
The last component of the market rate exists to the extent that money changes are not 
neutral. Sometimes product prices rise and fall faster or slower than factor prices. Sometimes 
their behavior can be mixed with some of product and some of factor prices rising more 
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rapidly. Whenever there is a divergence in the rate of movements in the prices of products 
and the prices of original factors, a terms-of-trade component emerges in the natural rate 
(ibid). We elaborate on this in the section on Cantillon-effects.  
In today’s markets the risk free (e.g. government bond) investment is substituted for the time 
element. This effectively means that by altering interest rates, governments and their central 
banks are manipulating the time-preference or the market price of time itself. According to 
Austrian theory this has consequences, which we will elaborate on later.  
The pure time preference theory remains theoretical in its foundations. However, it seems to 
us, at least, inconceivable that time, being the scarcest resource to any human being, should 
not have a price. In situations of deferred consumption, there must be some compensation, 
monetary or not, to make the extra time needed for the same satisfaction worthwhile to the 
person deferring this satisfaction. The actual compensation achieved by actors in the real 
world relies on other factors in addition to the time-preference of market participants and we 
will illuminate this further in later chapters when we look at time-preference theory along 
with erank Knight’s analysis of risk, uncertainty and profit.  
 
2.5   Austrian capital theory 
 
One of the key aspects of the Austrian school is its attention to capital theory. Austrian 
capital theory builds on the notion that capital is heterogeneous (Foss & Klein, 2012) and is 
organized in an intertemporal structure (Garrison, 2001). To illustrate the difference between 
Austrian capital theory and mainstream capital theory, we find it useful to first illustrate the 
mainstream model which Garrison (2012) refers to as the Clark-Knight model or rather 
“black-box” capital theory. 
Garrison describes the functioning of the capital stock in mainstream macro economics, 
where capital is understood as a uniform lump of units of capital; a “black box” that 
transforms input of resources to output instantly. Furthermore, the maintenance of this 
capital stock is reduced to a technical detail.  
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Figure  2.1 Black-Box Capital theory. 
This model is of course a simplification of reality and was intended to be as well. However, 
the simplification is so severe that important aspects of the economy’s functioning are lost. 
In this model capital is reduced to homogenous units which only have to be mixed with 
resources to create output. Production time is thought to be irrelevant on the basis that when 
a steady state of production is reached, production and consumption is simultaneous 
(Garrison, 2012). 
Austrian capital theory contends that capital is heterogeneous. There are many forms of 
capital and capital is heterogeneous in the sense that the same capital can have many uses. 
Such uses are discovered by entrepreneurs trying to find better ways of meeting consumer 
demands. This heterogeneous capital is organized in a production process; “-a sequence of 
activities in which the outputs associated with some activities feed in as inputs to subsequent 
activities” (Garrison, 2005). The production process consists of stages of production through 
time and the process eventually yields the final consumable output. Figure 2.2 illustrates this 
process of production.  
 
Figure  2.2 Intertemporal Capital Structure (Garrison, 2005) 
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Figure 2.2 shows ten stages of production and how value is added in each stage. The model 
also goes a long way in showing the imputation of value from the final consumer goods to 
the factors of production earlier in the production process. By this we mean that the price of 
a factor of production is its expected discounted marginal contribution to the final consumer 
good’s value. Menger referred to goods of different orders, where goods of the first order are 
consumable goods and then there are the goods of higher orders, which have their values 
derived from goods of the first order.    
The different stages in figure 2.2 must not be mistaken for specific businesses, but are 
merely there to help us visualize how production takes place. A specific business can be at 
several places in the triangle. Take for instance a coal mine. Coal can be sold directly to 
consumers for heating, sold to an electric plant which turns it into electricity or maybe the 
coal is sold to a steel mill to be used in steel production. Böhm-Bawerk also noted that “A 
growing economy is not just a consequence of increased capital investment, but also of 
longer and longer processes of production” (The Ludwig von Mises Institute (a), n.d.).  
In Austrian theory the element of time in production is of outmost importance due to the fact 
that the financing of production has a price in the form of interest. Thus, the production 
process must generate value at a faster or equal pace than that of financial costs. Figure 2.3 
illustrates this. 
 
Figure  2.3 Production process generating value through time 
The illustration shows an example of a profitable production process, financed trough debt. 
Interest paid on the financing of the production process will in this case determine how 
profitable it is as so long as we keep other things unchanged. If the interest payment was to 
rise to a point above the final market value of the goods produced, the production of this 
particular good would be unprofitable. In other words, the higher the interest rate, the faster 
the production process must add value to stay profitable. This has consequences for what 
projects might be undertaken by entrepreneurs. Projects and production processes which take 
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a lot of time before yielding a return are dependent on lower interest rates than competing 
short term projects. As shown in table 2.1, at 8 % interest rate the short term project is 
preferred to the long term, but if we reduce the interest rate to 4 % the situation changes and 
the long term project is now preferred, due to the different discounting of future cash flows.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Net present value of different cash flow structures 
 
If we think of this intertemporal structure of production as an aggregate of the whole 
economy, it is clear that interest rate will affect its structure. The capital structure adapt to 
changes in demand and prices through the actions of entrepreneurs. However, heterogeneous 
capital cannot be shifted around costlessly. The more severe the changes in prices and 
demand are, the more problematic this process will be. In essence, the capital structure is 
chasing an ever changing consumer demand, never catching completely up. The more often 
and quickly demand, and consequently prices, changes, the more problematic for 
entrepreneurs and the economy as a whole.   
Garrison (Garrison, 2013) sums up the differences between Austrian and conventional 
capital theory as the following:  
Conventional capital theory (Knight) Austrian capital theory (Hayek) 
Maintenance is a technical detail Maintenance is optional 
Capital is permanent  Capital is ever changing 
Capital is the only factor Capital is unique and heterogeneous  
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Long term project CF -200 -75 -50 100 200 250 250
NPV at 4% kr 344,58 -200 -72 -46 89 171 205 198
NPV at 8% kr 241,77 -200 -69 -43 79 147 170 158
Short term project 
CF -200 100 100 100 100 100 100
NPV at 4% kr 324,21 -200 96 92 89 85 82 79
NPV at 8% kr 262,29 -200 93 86 79 74 68 63
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Production time is irrelevant  Production time is key variable  
It’s all about sources and services It’s all about temporal structure 
Table 2.2 Austrian vs. Conventional capital theory 
 
2.6   Money and inflation 
 
The Austrian school theory of money adheres to a market based approach in which the 
market decides what to use as money. As Carl Menger noted, money evolved in the market 
place as some commodities where more saleable and could be obtained for the sole purpose 
of exchanging it for another commodity.  
As each economizing individual becomes increasingly more aware of his economic interest, he is led 
by this interest, without any agreement, without legislative compulsion, and even without regard to 
the public interest, to give his commodities in exchange for other, more saleable, commodities, even 
if he does not need them for any immediate consumption purpose. With economic progress, 
therefore, we can everywhere observe the phenomenon of a certain number of goods, especially those 
that are most easily saleable at a given time and place, becoming, under the powerful influence of 
custom, acceptable to everyone in trade, and thus capable of being given in exchange for any other 
commodity (Menger, 1871, 2007, p. 260). 
Menger describes here the origin of money and how some commodities came to be preferred 
as a medium of exchange. Thus money exists independent of any government interference 
when people are free to use whatever they want as money. As people learn that they can 
achieve greater satisfaction through “surrendering less saleable commodities for others of 
greater saleability” (Menger, 1871, 2007, p. 262) money comes into existents.  However, 
Menger also notes that government, by making laws regarding a certain commodity, can 
improve the money-character of that particular good (ibid).  
Money is also a necessity to perform economic calculation. To perform economic 
calculation there has to be established market prices in a common denominator. In an 
advanced economy the possible uses of resources are not obvious and consequently actors 
must have some way of calculating how to best allocate these resources. Money-prices as 
established in the market place provide this information by revealing the “exchange value” 
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of particular good in relation to money. Money-prices thus provide market actors with a 
reliable and calculable measure of relative values. However, money must not be confused as 
a measure of value. A measure of value must not necessarily be money, and vice versa. Still, 
the particulars of a certain form of money might make it suitable as a measure of value due 
to established prices and the inherent properties of that particular form of money (Menger, 
1871, 2007).  
Menger concludes that neither a measure of value nor a store of value are functions which 
can be attributed to money as such, but the fact that some forms of money serves these 
purposes better than others makes them preferred. This goes a long way in explaining the 
popularity of metal coins as money throughout history.  
Mises took on the challenge of elaborating Menger’s analysis of money in his book Theory 
of Money and Credit (1912). Most notable were the problem of explaining the value of 
money and applying marginal utility theory to it (The Ludwig von Mises Institute (a), n.d.). 
The problem at the time was that in order to explain the marginal value of money, one has to 
assume an object that has already got purchasing power. To know the value of money we 
must know its purchasing power, but how can one explain the purchasing power in terms of 
value?  
Mises solved this question through his regression theorem. The value of money is 
determined by the purchasing power it had the day before. And the purchasing power of the 
day before is determined by the value it had the day before again. This moves the question 
back in time instead of circles, but the question remains if this regression can continue 
infinitely back in time. Mises’ answer was that this regression stops at the time where the 
object was first used as money and was valued as a commodity or consumer good 
(Hülsmann, 2005). This implies that money must always originate in the market and that fiat 
currencies derived their value from the commodities they were once linked to (The Ludwig 
von Mises Institute (a), n.d.).    
By establishing this theory Mises was able to apply the same theoretic framework as applied 
to any good in the market, thus ending the separation of monetary theory from the general 
economic theory of individual action and utility, supply and demand. (Rothbard, 1976/1997). 
Thus, supply is the total stock of money and demand is the total market demand to gain and 
hold cash balances based upon its marginal utility of individuals subjective value scales.  
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Rothbard continued Mises’ work on monetary theory building on the same notions of 
subjective value scales and marginal utility. Rothbard rejected the Keynesian theories of 
liquidity preferences and speculative demand. Using the framework of a free market 
economy and a commodity money (100% reserve gold standard), Rothbard explains that 
money-demand constitutes an exchange-demand and a cash-balance demand for money. 
Exchange demand, or pre-income demand, is that demand for money which originates from 
sellers of all other goods, wishing to buy money.  
Cash-balance demand, or post-income demand, is the more volatile component and is 
determined by the moneys’ marginal value in everyone’s subjective value scales. The total 
demand for money is the sum of these two components. The money supply constitutes the 
total stock of money commodity at any given time (Rothbard, 1962/2001).  
Figure 2.4 shows the total demand for money as a sum of the two aforementioned demands 
for money and the supply as given by the monetary stock. We clearly see that this model of 
the market for money is a self-correcting one. Were the PPM to be slightly higher than the 
equilibrium point A, people would want to reduce their cash balances. This would again 
drive down the PPM as people sell money for goods.  
 
Figure  2.4 Determination of the equilibrium point for the exchange-value of money 
(Rothbard, 1962/2001) 
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Figure  2.5 Estimated Consumer Prices Index 1800-1912. Source: www.minneapolisfed.org 
Were the PPM to be lowered, the effect would be reversed as demand for money is higher 
than the stock. Rothbard thus concludes that “there is no such thing as “too little” or “too 
much” money, that, whatever the social money stock, the benefits of’ money are always 
utilized to the maximum extent” (Rothbard, 1962/2001, p. 670). An increase or decrease in 
the money supply, Rothbard concludes, confers no social benefit, but can only benefit some 
at the expense of others.  
The self-adjusting nature of the money market means that in an expanding economy the 
natural trend is for prices to fall and PPM to rise, ceteris paribus. Figure 2.5 show the 
estimated CPI of USA from 1800-1912. There is a general rise in PPM during the period, 
starting at 51 in 1800 and ending at 29 in 1912. The spikes are due to the war of 1812 and 
the American Civil War, both necessitating the printing of fiat currency and the suspension 
of metal standards. The rise in PPM would have been even more had it not been for the huge 
gold findings of the late 1840s in America and further discoveries in Alaska and South 
Africa in the late 19
th
 century.  
In the Austrian tradition, inflation is viewed as an increase in the money supply or rather the 
stock of money, not an increase in consumer prices. This is important to take note of as we 
will be using this definition of inflation throughout this thesis. Austrian theory describes 
inflation of the money supply as a sequence which we will elaborate on in section 2.6.  
Regarding the purchasing power of money, Rothbard also denies that there exists a measure 
of such a thing. He uses the following example to elucidate his position:  
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Example 2.1 The purchasing power of money 
Let us now assume that the following is the array of prices in the PPM on day 1:  
10 cents per pound of sugar.  
10 dollars per hat.  
500 dollars per TV set.  
5 dollars per hour legal service of Mr. Jones, Lawyer.  
 
Now suppose the following array of prices of the same goods on day 2:  
15 cents per pound of sugar.                                                                                                       
20 dollars per hat.              
300 dollars per TV set.  
8 dollars per hour of Mr. Jones’ legal service.  
Now what can economics say has happened to the PPM over these two periods? All that we 
can legitimately say is that now 1 dollar can buy 1/20 of a hat, instead of 1/10 of a hat, 1/300 
of a TV set, instead of 1/500 of a set etc, etc. Thus, we can describe (if we know the figures) 
what happened to each individual price in the market array. But how much of the price rise 
of the hat was due to a rise in the demand for hats and how much to a fall in the demand for 
money? There is no way of answering such a question. We do not even know for certain 
whether the PPM has risen or declined. All we do know is that the purchasing power of 
money has fallen in terms of sugar, hats, and legal services, and risen in terms of TV sets. 
Even if all the prices in the array had risen we would not know by how much the PPM had 
fallen, and we would not know how much of the change was due to an increase in the 
demand for money and how much to changes in stocks. If the supply of money changed 
during this interval, we would not know how much of the change was due to the increased 
supply and how much to the other determinants. (Rothbard, 1962/2001, p. 738) 
However, Rothbard do concur that there is a use for indices based on fixed quantity weights 
for a base period (Rothbard, 1962/2001, p. 740). Such indices of “market baskets” provide a 
proxy, but are not without difficulties. There is no such thing as an average buyer, only 
individual buyers with individual preferences. They all have their own unique basket. Thus, 
the assumed change in PPM will be different for every individual. Consider the sharp rise in 
housing prices in Norway the last 15 years.  
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During the same time the mortgage rate has fallen considerably. For the person who bought a 
house and took up a mortgage 15 years ago, housing expenses has fallen, assuming he has an 
adjustable rate mortgage. For the individual who has not yet bought a house, but who wants 
to do so, houses have become more expensive. Each year, his salary can buy less of a house. 
The change in the CPI is perceived differently for each individual. While the first individual 
experiences increased purchasing power, the second individual experiences a decreased 
purchasing power, ceteris paribus.   
 
2.7   Cantillon effects 
 
Cantillon effects are named after the 18
th
 century French economist Richard Cantillon. 
Cantillon is widely credited as the first to point out the relative changes in prices resulting 
from changes in the money supply. Cantillon effects are the real changes in resource 
allocation resulting from the change in relative prices between the time the new money 
enters the economy and the time where the economy has fully adjusted to the new money 
supply (The Ludwig von Mises Institute (b), n.d.). New money enters the economy while 
still retaining the original PPM. The preferences of the “first spenders” will therefore have a 
higher impact on the capital structure. Resources are, to a larger extent, allocated to the 
wants of these first spenders.  
The increased demand in those sectors preferred by first spenders will increase profits and 
lead to resources being allocated to this particular use. Thus inflation does not affect all 
prices equally or at the same time, but through a sequence dependent on the spending 
behavior of money holders all along the channels of monetary flows (The Ludwig von Mises 
Institute (b), n.d.). The producers of goods demanded by the first spenders will increase their 
spending as a result. Resources will again be allocated, to a larger extent, according to the 
demands of these secondary spenders and so forth. If new money enters the economy 
through investors, one will expect the CPI to be one of the last places this inflation will show 
up. On the other hand, if the new money enters the economy though the salaries of 
government workers, one would expect this inflation to show up in the CPI more quickly, 
assuming they are more likely to use it for consumption goods.  
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Cantillon effects can also be used to explain economic bubbles. Were the new money to be 
pent up in a particular market, meaning that the second receiver of the new money used it to 
buy the same thing as the first receiver, prices would keep rising in this particular market as 
long as new money keeps flowing in. The inflation would not, to the same extent, spill into 
other parts of the economy. An example would be such as the credit fueled American 
housing bubble of the mid 2000s. The same can be said of stock markets or other asset 
markets. Bubbles can, of course, also occur without any new money entering the economy. If 
the market participants were struck by a mania and allocated much of their income to a 
particular asset market, one might be able to produce a bubble. However, in this case no 
inflation has taken place. The increased money demand for this particular asset must then be 
offset by decreased money demand for other goods and assets. To make the distinction 
between a bubble induced by monetary expansion and a bubble induced by real changes in 
peoples subjective value scales, we suggest the term pent up inflation for the former and 
mania for the latter.  
The essence of Cantillon effects is that money is never neutral, due to the transition period 
where the economy adjusts to the new money supply. There is no way of “putting” new 
money into the economy without distorting the capital structure, both with regards to the 
composition of demand and through interest distortions. New money entering the economy 
creates winners, those who receive it first, and losers, those who receive it last.  
 
2.8   The Austrian Business Cycle theory 
 
The Austrian school is probably most renowned for its alternative business cycle theory 
(ABCT), receiving increased attention after the 2008 financial crisis. However, in our 
experience most economists are not familiar with ABCT and we hope to give the reader a 
concise yet thorough interpretation of it in the following. We will base our interpretation 
mostly on Roger Garrison’s book Time and Money (2001), which provides a good heuristic 
toolset for understanding ABCT.  
Garrison’s model consists of a three graphical building blocks. These are the production 
possibilities frontier (PPF), a loanable-funds market (LFM) and the intertemporal structure 
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of production (ISP) also known as a Hayekian triangle. Using these we are able to give an 
intuitive picture of what the ABCT states. 
 
2.8.1 The loanable funds market 
 
The LFM as shown in figure 2.6 represents the supply and demand for loanable funds at 
different interest rates broadly conceived. Consumer lending is netted out so only the 
macroeconomic relevant saving is included in this setup. Net lending is the savings of all 
income earners made available for investors to maintain and expand the capital structure. 
Retained earnings and saving in the form of purchasing equity shares are also included. The 
supply of loanable funds represents that income which is not consumed, but rather put to 
work and earning interest.  
 
 
Figure  2.6 The market for loanable funds. (Garrison, 2001, p. 37) 
Some basic assumptions in this model need to be clarified. There is of course a small portion 
of income which is neither spent nor lent, but is part of the cash-balance demand or the 
liquidity preference of consumers and businesses. In an indirect way these liquid funds serve 
as a form of saving since they are not spent on current consumption. This introduces some 
slippage into the model, but as Garrison notes this has little effect on the model because “to 
the extent that an increase in saving is accompanied by an increase in liquidity preferences, it 
does not substantially increase the supply of loanable funds and hence has little effect on the 
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rate of interest” (Garrison, 2001, p. 37). Changes in liquidity preferences, or cash-balance 
demand in Rothbard’s terms, would affect the PPM which could present their own problems.  
The demand for loanable funds represents the willingness of borrowers to invest in the 
economy’s production process. Investment in this context refers to means of production 
including plants, tools, machinery and goods in process as well as human capital. Thus, the 
demand for loanable funds reflects the businesses’ eagerness to pay known input prices 
today in order to receive some unknown payment in the future.  
The loanable funds market facilitates the coordination of production plans with consumer 
preferences. The rate of interest serves as a signal as to how much demand there will be in 
the future. An increased savings rate will allow for more consumption in the future and vice 
versa. Discrepancies between the interest rate and input and output prices will be exploited 
by entrepreneurs. Exploiting these intertemporal discrepancies earns the entrepreneur profits 
which again attracts other entrepreneurs, reducing the discrepancies of a particular market 
over time. If we were to make the unrealistic assumption of no changes in the underlying 
economic reality, all investors would earn the market rate of interest.  
The market process, consisting of the actions of fallible men, is of course not perfect. This 
introduces some discoordination due to errors made by entrepreneurs, such as making an 
unprofitable investment. The LFM registers the expected rate of return net of the losses 
incurred by this discoordination. Thus, the loan rate of interest is not a pure rate of interest 
and reflects more than underlying time preferences, as described in section 2.3.  
Regarding the loan rate of interest there are some differences between capital-based and 
conventional macroeconomics. Expected losses on the demand side is usually identified as 
business confidence, and changes in the level of expected losses are explained by psychology 
or “the waxing and waning of “animal spirits,” to use Keynes’ colorful phrase” (Garrison, 
2001, p. 38). Capital-based theory calls for an economic explanation for changes in expected 
losses. The normal assumption will therefore be: no changes in the general level of expected 
losses except when our market analysis suggests so.  
On the supply side there exists a similar contrast between capital-based and conventional 
theory. Expectations of loss, manifesting itself as a loss of business confidence on the 
demand side, manifests itself as an increase in liquidity preference on the supply side in 
conventional theory. But liquidity preference, like business confidence, seems to call for a 
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psychological explanation. In capital-based theory, lender’s risk is a more suitable term 
calling for an economic explanation. In capital-based theory, changes in both expected losses 
and lender’s risk are not assumed unless analysis of market conditions suggests so.   
Figure 2.6 identifies a market clearing, or equilibrium, rate of interest where saving and 
investment are brought into equality. This is the conventional understanding of the LFM. 
However, in application there is an unconventional understanding of the LFM critical to its 
incorporation into capital-based macroeconomics. Capital-based theory does not rely on two 
conflicting construction, one for the long run and one for the short run. An increase in saving 
now means an increase in consumption in the future and increased profitability for resources 
committed to meet that future consumption demand. There is no “paradox of thrift” causing 
the economy to “automatically” fail and explanations for sluggish economic performance 
must be found elsewhere. To help identify instances in which the market process works, or 
fails to work, we must introduce the production possibilities frontier (PPF), the second 
element of capital-based macroeconomics.  
 
2.8.2 The production possibilities frontier 
 
Although present, the PPF is never an integrated part of conventional macroeconomic 
analysis. In Austrian theory it becomes a cornerstone for understanding the basic options for 
an economy. 
The PPF shows the tradeoff between two alternative outputs that are negatively related. 
Figure 2.7 demonstrates the case of guns and butter. Some resources are suited for the 
production of either output; some other resources are better suited to producing guns and 
some to producing butter. To change the mix of output it becomes necessary to use resources 
better suited for one output for producing the other. This results in an increasing cost in 
butter to produce one additional unit of guns.  
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Figure  2.7 The production possibilities frontier (Garrison, 2001, p. 41) 
In its application in capital-based macroeconomics, the PPF draws attention to the fact that 
an economy grows to the extent that it uses resources to make capital goods instead of 
consumer goods, thereby increasing its productive capabilities and roundaboutness.  
In capital-based theory, the PPF shows the tradeoff between consumption (C) and 
investment (I). Together with saving (S) this construction allows for a convenient link to 
conventional macroeconomics which uses these same aggregates. Investment is measured in 
gross terms, allowing for capital maintenance, consumption and expansion. There is a point 
at the PPF curve where gross investment is just enough to offset capital depreciation. Figure 
2.8 shows different states of an economy.  
 
Figure  2.8 Gross investment and growth (contraction, stationarity, and expansion) 
(Garrison, 2001, p. 43) 
In a mixed economy there must be made room for government spending (G) and taxes (T). 
In the simplest form, government imposes a “head tax” and spends the money in a way 
wholly unrelated to the private sector, and maintains a balanced budget. In such a case, the 
PPF simply applies to the private sector of a mixed economy. How the size, shape and 
location on the PPF are affected by government will depend on how the tax system is 
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designed and how revenues are used by government. Just how this affects the PPF is beyond 
the scope of this analysis.  
However, in the simplified case above we can expand the model to include debt-financed 
government spending simply by relabeling the x-axis in the loanable funds market I+Gd, 
where Gd is the debt-financed government spending. In this case we ignore the possibility of 
inflationary finance. Government borrowing being additive to private investment affects 
interest rates and the intertemporal allocation of resources.  
The PPF demonstrates to us sustainable combinations of C and I in a fully employed private 
economy or the fully employed private sector of a mixed economy. However, the PPF is not 
absolute. Consumption and investment can temporarily move together outside the frontier 
and, in the event of an economy-wide downturn, move inside the frontier. 
 
2.8.3 The intertemporal structure of production 
 
In conventional macroeconomics, attention to the stages of production is limited to avoid 
double counting when constructing aggregates (e.g. national income accounts). By only 
summing the value added in each stage one is able to calculate the total value of final output. 
Thus, emphasis is put in the value dimension of the stages and not the time dimension.  
In capital-based macroeconomics attention is paid to both the value dimension and the time 
dimension. The relationship between final, consumable output value and production time is 
represented graphically as the legs of a right triangle (as shown in section 2.4). The 
hypotenuse expresses value added on a continuous basis. Thus, the value of a good in 
process is the vertical distance between its location on the hypotenuse and the horizontal 
axis, systemically discounted relative to the finished consumer good.  For the sake of 
simplicity, a linear construction is chosen over an exponential one.  
Figure 2.9 shows this construct also known as a Hayekian triangle. It identifies five different 
stages of production as mining, refining, manufacturing, distribution and retailing. This 
identification is purely for illustrative purposes. Some time a particular business might be at 
several places in the structure. Consider a coal mine producing coal for steel and electricity 
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as well as coal for people’s barbecues. With regards to the modern day service oriented 
economy, education and training can be regarded as early stages of production, producing 
human capital which again yields consumable services or input services.  
To make the triangle adaptable to the PPF it stops at output. However, it is easy to imagine a 
mirrored consumption triangle, taking into account consumer durables as part of the output. 
This is shown in figure 2.10. This gives a broader picture of the economy, but offers little to 
our analysis. It is production that is hard and complicated. Consumption is the easy part.  
 
Figure  2.9 The structure of production (continuous-input/point-output) (Garrison, 2001, p. 
47) 
 
Figure  2.10 The structure of production and consumption (Garrison, 2001, p. 48) 
The Hayekian triangle we use might seem overly simplistic. However, the triangle is 
designed to set complexities aside and highlight the macroeconomic aspects of intertemporal 
equilibrium and intertemporal disequilibrium.  
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2.8.4 The macroeconomics of capital structure 
 
Figure 2.11 shows the three previous figures in an interconnected construct depicting a 
wholly private economy or the private sector of a mixed economy, as discussed above. The 
LFM and the PPF are connected by their common horizontal axis measuring investment. The 
structure of production and the PPF are connected by their common vertical axis measuring 
consumption. The connection between the structure of production and the LFM is not as 
explicit, but critical to our understanding of the model. The slope of the hypotenuse reflects 
the market clearing interest rate. Garrison argues that “reflects” is as strong a connection 
which can be made with a continuous-input construction. The slope of the hypotenuse 
reflects more than the interest rate, partly due to inputs being added and partly due to the 
temporal proximity to consumable output. However, under given institutional arrangements 
the interest rate and the slope of the hypotenuse will move in the same direction. A higher 
(lower) interest rate will result in a steeper (shallower) slope. If the consumers have a low 
time preference, this makes possible a more roundabout and faster growing economy.  
 
Figure  2.11 The macroeconomics of capital structure (Garrison, 2001, p. 50) 
The location of the economy on the PPF implies full employment, or rather the natural rate 
of unemployment. The compatibility of the three elements implies that the market clearing 
interest rate is also the “natural” rate of interest.  
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In its simplest form, this construct depicts a fully employed, no-growth economy, where 
investments are just enough to offset depreciation. The interest rate reflects the participants’ 
time-preference. This steady-state structure resembles Mises’ Evenly Rotating Economy 
where production and consumption takes place, but there is no uncertainty and change. This 
gives us an initial benchmark for further analysis of what Garrison calls secular growth and 
cyclical fluctuations.  
Figure 2.11 looks very different from traditional ISLM analysis. Unlike the ISLM analysis, 
the graphics does not include a market for money. However, money is present in every 
diagram and is assumed to allow participants to avoid the inefficiencies of barter. 
Furthermore, the monetary phenomena in the context capital-based macroeconomics, is a 
source of looseness in the market process governing the intertemporal allocation of 
resources.  
 
2.8.5 Secular growth 
 
Figure 2.12 depicts a case where an economy is expanding from t=0 to t=2. The Austrian 
notion of secular growth occurs without being provoked by policy or technological 
advancements. The only prerequisite for secular growth is that gross investment is larger 
than capital depreciation. The interest rate is assumed to remain constant, that is no change 
in time preference. This is represented by the shifts of the supply curve in the LFM, yielding 
the same interest rate in every period. Note that the interest rate expresses time preference, 
not the supply curve. However, as Garrison points out, historically, increased wealth is 
accompanied by decreased time preference, causing the interest rate to fall. In the case of 
secular growth the model abstracts from this relationship.  
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Figure  2.12 Secular growth (Garrison, 2001, p. 54) 
The economy expands due to the increasing amount of capital which again leads to an 
increase in consumable output. The unchanged interest rate results in an unchanged slope of 
the hypotenuse. Where the consumers to lower their time preferences, this would reduce the 
slope and make more time consuming production processes possible. Consider such time 
consuming and uncertain processes as research and development. With a lower interest rate, 
these processes are more economically viable. Thus, a lower time preference can speed up 
technological advancements.  
In the case of technology induced growth, this translates into as if the subsistence fund 
increased. This leads to more profitable opportunities for investment and the increased 
demand for financing might cause the interest rate to rise. However, unlike other 
macroeconomic constructions, it is not necessarily so that a positive technology shock causes 
the equilibrium interest rate to rise. As the economy grows faster as a result of technological 
advancements, so does income and savings. The increased savings might suffice to drive 
down the interest rate again. This is shown in Figure 2.13 where interest rates first rise along 
S as demand changes from D to D’. The increased income, resulting from technological 
advancements, causes a shift in time-preference and a shift of the supply curve from S to S’. 
This reduces the interest rate to its former level.  
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Figure  2.13 Technology-induced growth (Garrison, 2001, p. 59) 
 
2.8.6 Changes in time preference 
 
Changes in consumers’ time preference can also result in increased growth, and this 
particular aspect is of outmost importance in the Austrian school. In figure 2.14 an increase 
in thriftiness is depicted as a rightward shift in the supply of loanable funds. With the 
demand for loanable funds unchanged, this results in a lowering of the interest rate, a 
reduction in current consumption and an increase in investment. The reduced interest rate 
results in a shallower slope of the hypotenuse. Unlike Keynes’ theory, the reduced current 
consumption implies increased consumption in the future.  Entrepreneurs are guided by the 
interest rate in their decisions to invest.  
To presuppose that the business community perceives a reduction in current consumption as 
permanent begs the question as to how the intertemporal allocation of resource ever got to be 
what it is. Such a vision of the market economy means it could never cope with changes in 
consumers’ time preference. eurthermore, if the business community perceives a reduction 
in consumption as permanent, would it not also perceive an increase in consumption the 
same way? 
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Figure  2.14 Time-preference induced capital restructuring (Garrison, 2001, p. 65). 
Figure 2.14 also shows stage specific labor-markets to visualize the change of resource 
allocation which takes place as resources are bid from late stages to earlier stages of 
production.  
 
2.8.7 Boom and Bust 
 
In the previous we have shown have an economy moves from one intertemporal equilibrium 
to another without any interference from any monetary authorities. This enables us to 
distinguish between genuine growth and an artificial boom.  
We will now describe what happens, according to Austrian theory, in an economy where a 
central bank, or fractional reserve banks for that matter, increases the money supply. Figure 
2.15 depicts an economy’s reaction to a credit expansion, while time preferences are 
assumed to be unchanging. The money supply is assumed to be under the control of a 
monetary authority i.e. a central bank. The supply of loanable funds consist of both saving 
by income earners and funds made available by the central bank. The new money enters the 
economy through the credit markets since this is most consistent with modern economies in 
general. The central bank often has multiple ways for manipulating the money supply, or 
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rather the supply of credit. Common to these are that an increase in the money supply puts 
downward pressure on interest rates.  
 
Figure  2.15 Government induced intertemporal disequilibrium (Garrison, 2001, p. 69). 
We assume the central bank to set a target interest rate i’ and take actions to meet this target. 
By increasing the money supply, the central bank is able to push the interest rate down to the 
targeted value. The new money in the form of additional credit is labeled ΔMc in recognition 
that the monetary expansion might not fully translate into credit expansion. It is possible that 
some people would choose to increase their cash holdings as a reaction to policy induced 
changes in the interest rate. Such changes in the demand for cash balances, although not 
without effects of its own, are of secondary importance.  
Unlike the example of secular growth, the policy induced interest causes divergence between 
consumers’ allocation of income and investors’ expectations about the future. At the new 
lower interest rate, consumers want to save less and consume more. However, investors are 
given the signal to invest more, the same signal they would have perceived if a change in 
time preference where causing the change in interest rate. The credit market is sending two 
opposing signals. The increased investment pulls the PPF location east, while the increased 
consumption pulls north. The result is an economy trying to locate outside the PPF. The 
economy is trying to have it “both ways” so to speak.  
Due to the looseness of money, the opposing forces do not cancel each other out 
immediately. Instead, resource prices are bid up due to the increase in the money supply. 
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Some prices rice more than others as was discussed in the section on Cantillon-effects. The 
lower interest rate makes long term projects seem relatively more attractive to investors. At 
the same time increased consumption results in increased cash flows.  
The changes in interest rates and the increase in consumption cause the Hayekian triangle to 
take two different forms, indicating intertemporal disequilibrium. The forces pulling for 
investment calls for a shallow slope of the hypotenuse while consumer spending calls for a 
steeper one. Resources are, according to capital-based theory, bid away from the middle of 
the triangle into early stages and late stages. Consider such early stages to be the investment 
in a skyscraper and late stages to be increases in inventories and a general increase in 
capacities. The broken hypotenuse indicates that the restructuring cannot actually take place.  
Austrian theory contends that monetary authorities manipulate the signals given by the credit 
market, causing consumption to increase and entrepreneurs to embark upon unprofitable 
projects. The signals of low interest rates favor long term projects and increased 
consumption creates expectations of larger cash flows. At some point it is revealed that 
projects are not profitable. As entrepreneurs bid for increasingly scarce resources, prices rise 
until projects are no longer profitable.  These unprofitable projects, or malinvestments, must 
then be liquidated and boom turns into bust.  
According to Paul Cwik (2004) a boom usually comes to an end when interest rates start to 
rise. Interest rates will eventually start to rise either trough a real resource crunch whereby 
the rising prices of input factors causes an ever increasing demand for credit, or through a 
credit crunch whereby the monetary authorities jack up rates when the annual growth in the 
CPI becomes unacceptable.  
We will leave our inquiry into the Austrian Business Cycle theory for now, but revisit it 
during our discussion on entrepreneurship. There is still much to be said about the distortive 
effects of monetary expansion.   
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2.9   Critics of the Austrian School  
 
Among the common criticisms of the Austrian school is its lack of empirical foundation 
(Horwitz, 2012). That is its reluctance to test its theories empirically. The claim that one can 
reach correct conclusion through the use of a priori principles without engaging in empirical 
analysis, is a bold one. This way of thinking has been ridiculed as armchair economics, 
referring to the idea that one can deduce all of economics from one’s armchair.  
However, this image of the Austrian school is more of a caricature than a reality. The 
Austrian skepticism towards empirical analysis has its origins in its subjectivist foundation. 
Empirical analysis may provide correlation, but it is up to theory and the human mind to 
provide causation. Furthermore, statistical analysis is not without its own a priori 
assumptions, such as normal distribution, and a general overconfidence in the validity and 
robustness of the data. That is to say, not recognizing the fragility of statistical analysis 
based on limited economic data (Leamer, 1983).  
To Austrians, empirical analysis is not off the table, but comes second to the theoretical 
analysis. Correlation is second to causation. Consider an example. The Austrian theory 
claims that an increase in the money supply by a central bank will reduce interest rates. If so 
happens and interest rates do not fall, the statistical data would refute this claim. However, 
the Austrian economist would then claim that interest rates are lower than they otherwise 
would have been. The logically deduced economic laws of the Austrian School are claimed 
to be uncontestable by empirical analysis. Thus a statistical analysis which yields a result in 
opposition to these laws must be discarded as erroneous.  
While statistical analysis cannot, according to the Austrian school, be used to establish 
economic laws, it can be useful in determining which economic laws, and their effects, are at 
play at different times. George Selgin (2012) makes the argument that although the 
theoretical arguments of the Austrian School might be logically valid, it is necessary to 
determine how useful it is in explaining any particular historical episode. It might be the case 
that the effect, as stipulated by Austrian theory, is trivial. We revisit our example above. If 
the central bank conducted a monetary expansion, how can we know if the difference it 
made was not trivial?  
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To answer this question might prove impossible even if statistical analysis is employed, yet 
it shows us how statistical analysis can be useful in determining specific magnitudes of 
economic laws. That is not to say that there can be statistical laws, but one might uncover 
significant tendencies. As Selgin writes: 
What’s in between is trying to arrive at an informed estimate of just how much of any observed 
phenomenon an applicable theory explains and, when there are several equally applicable theories, 
their relative worth (Selgin, 2012).  
The lack of empirical analysis demonstrating the explanatory power of Austrian theories 
might be the reason why the Austrian school remains on the fringes of the economic science. 
We concur that the Austrian school might enjoy a more central position if more statistical 
works of the kind mentioned where undertaken. As Antony Davies writes: “… in their 
skepticism, Austrians miss an opportunity to use statistical analysis to refute non-Austrian 
claims” (Davies, 2012).  
Another critique of the Austrian School is the claim that Austrian theory is not very Austrian 
at all (e.g. Caplan, 1997; Selgin, 2012). The claim is that Austrian theory is already part of 
conventional theory and there is almost no significant distinction to be made. We find this to 
be true in the sense that much of it is overlapping, but the differences lies in the subtleties. 
That is, the debate must become quite specific for these differences to emerge. Moreover, it 
seems to us that this critique often comes from more open-minded mainstream economists 
who have learned to appreciate some of the insights from the Austrian School.  
The Austrian Business Cycle theory (ABCT) has been a topic of controversy and critique 
ever since the 1930s and continues to be so in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (e.g. 
Krugman, 1998; Krugman, 2008; Caplan, 1997; Tullock, 1988). Particularly the notion of 
overinvestment due to lowered interest rates, has received much criticism for being logically 
incoherent. Austrian economist Joseph T. Salerno (2012a) argues that much of mainstream 
interpretation of the theory misrepresents essential features of it and conflicts with its 
presentation by its leading proponents, thus leading to erroneous conclusions. 
Overinvestment is not part of modern ABCT, and Salerno argues that these critics paint a 
caricature of the theory.   
Another critique occurring quite often is that ABCT takes entrepreneurs to be stupid. The 
claim that temporarily lowered interest rate causes entrepreneurs to foolishly embark upon 
 47 
projects which will reveal themselves to be unprofitable when interest rates rise, is somewhat 
ridiculed. After all, if the entrepreneurs know interest rates will rise, why would they embark 
upon such projects?  
The answer is that entrepreneurs are not stupid, nor are they infallible. Furthermore, it is not 
only lowered interest rates which affect willingness to invest, but also increased 
consumption demand induced by the same lowering of interest rates. In the events when 
such critics come from economists claiming the entrepreneurs to be governed by animal 
spirits, we find it humorous more than anything.  
We will revisit the case of the entrepreneur facing the ABC in the next chapter.  
 
2.10 Conclusions on the Austrian School 
 
Although much of the Austrian theory is mostly similar to conventional economics, we find 
there are some major aspects which set it apart. The Austrian emphasis on time, uncertainty 
and on capital as a structure might be what significantly separates it from mainstream 
economics. The implication of intertemporal disequilibrium and uncertainty (agents act on 
incomplete information) clearly sets Austrian economics apart from conventional economics.  
Furthermore, Austrian economics does not attempt to construct mathematical decision rules, 
which is an implication of the uncertainty and incompleteness of information in economic 
phenomena. This also implies that the ability to make accurate forecasting is not viewed as 
the goal of economics as a science.   
In our further analysis, these key aspects will be the basis for distinguishing the Austrian 
school from conventional economics.  
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3.   The Entrepreneur 
 
3.1  What is Entrepreneurship? 
 
When talking of entrepreneurship, it is not entirely clear what exactly is meant. In general, 
most people refer to entrepreneurship as the process of starting new businesses and the 
entrepreneur being the visionary owner of this new business. However, there are many 
interpretations of what exactly entrepreneurship is. We will here review some of the 
explanations of entrepreneurship and then build on these to construct a theory of 
entrepreneurship in accordance with Austrian theory.  
One of the earliest notions of entrepreneurship was made by 18
th
 century economist Richard 
Cantillon. Cantillon defines the entrepreneur as “the person who buys at a known price to 
sell at an uncertain price” and being at the core the economic process in a market economy 
(Murphy, 1986). This definition clearly involves the entrepreneur as being a risk-taker, 
assuming his own judgments about future prices are the correct ones.  
Joseph Schumpeter is widely acknowledged for his work on entrepreneurship. His definition 
links entrepreneurship to innovation, and entrepreneurs being those who implement 
innovation within markets. This entrepreneurial change has 5 manifestations. 1) the 
introduction of a new (or improved) good; 2) the introduction of a new method of 
production; 3) the opening of a new market; 4) the exploitation of a new source of supply; 
and 5) the re-engineering/organization of business management processes (Ahmad & 
Seymoure, 2008). Schumpeter’s definition does not imply that the entrepreneur must be an 
inventor himself, only that he implements it and thus bring about change in the economy 
(Hagedoorn, 1996, p. 889).  
Furthermore, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur need not be a business owner or risk-taker. 
Schumpeter also views entrepreneurial activity as disturbing the economy’s equilibrium state 
and being a source of business cycles. The entrepreneur is understood as a disequilibrating 
factor (Kirzner, 1973). Following this logic, the economy would be in equilibrium when 
absent of entrepreneurial activity. Rothbard criticizes his theory for having no relation to the 
 49 
real world and being “a mere exercise in equilibrium logic leading nowhere” (Rothbard, 
1987). 
3
   
Frank Knight (1921, 1935) emphasizes the bearing of uncertainty as the key aspect of 
entrepreneurship, uncertainty being the source of profits and losses. The Entrepreneur 
receives a profit when his judgments about uncertain future conditions prove to be correct. 
We clearly see the resemblance with Cantillon’s definition. Knight’s theory of profit and 
uncertainty will be given more attention in section 3.2.  
Ludwig von Mises (1949/1996) describes the entrepreneur in a similar way as Knight. The 
entrepreneur, according to Mises, is someone who deals with the uncertain conditions of the 
future. Since human action is always aiming at the future, there is an element of 
entrepreneurship in all human action. However, for the sake of illuminating economic 
phenomena one must narrow the concept of entrepreneurship down to what it means in a 
Catallactic context. In this sense, Mises argues:  
The specific entrepreneurial function consists in determining the employment of the factors of 
production. The entrepreneur is the man who dedicates them to special purposes. In doing so he is 
driven solely by the selfish interest in making profits and in acquiring wealth. But he cannot evade 
the law of the market. He can succeed only by best serving the consumers. His profit depends on the 
approval of his conduct by the consumers. (Mises, 1949/1996, p. 290)  
It is not hard to envision entrepreneurs who are not solely motivated by profits, but one must 
realize that profits are a mean, not an end. Where the entrepreneur to disregard profits 
completely he would lose his capital and not be able to fulfill whatever desires he might 
have. 
Determining the employment of resources implies control of the resources to be employed. 
Whether control of resources implies ownership will be discussed later.  
Mises’ description of entrepreneurship has many commonalities with that of erank Knight’s. 
Uncertainty, as opposed to risk, is the key to unlocking the origins of profits and loss. 
Uncertainty is a result of change not predictable in a scientific way. The economy as a 
                                                 
3 eor a thorough critique of Schumpeter’s theory see Rothbard ( 1987) available at 
https://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/R1_6.PDF 
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dynamic and ever changing phenomenon stands in contrast to modern teachings of 
economics where equilibrium is at the core. The neglect of entrepreneurship in modern 
analysis is a direct consequence of the general preoccupation with final equilibrium positions 
(Kirzner, 1979).  
Austrian school economist Israel Kirzner defines the entrepreneur as a recognizer of profit 
opportunities. Kirzner employs a rather peculiar construct to illuminate the entrepreneurial 
process. First of all, he uses the notion of spontaneous learning, meaning the sudden 
recognition of a profit opportunity or in a more general sense; a chance for improved 
satisfaction. The agent’s ability to recognize such opportunities is dependent on his own 
alertness. Once such an opportunity is recognized as beneficial, it becomes a resource 
(Gunning, 2000).  
The entrepreneurial process, in this sense, is the alertness to and recognition of profit 
opportunities. Once recognized, profits are realized through pure arbitrage and the 
entrepreneur becomes in essence an arbitrageur. In Kirzner’s construct of a pure 
entrepreneur economy, agents are divided into pure entrepreneurs and Robbinsian 
economizers. This construct is a market where consumers and resource owners are strictly 
Robbinsian economizer, exclusively price-takers whose role it is to “use known available 
resources in the most efficient manner to achieve given purposes” (Kirzner, 1979, p. 6). The 
pure entrepreneurs are solely responsible for the changes in prices, production methods and 
quantities. By uncovering profit opportunities, the pure entrepreneurs provide new 
knowledge for the Robbinsian economizers to act upon.   
Kirzner’s construct does not go a long way in describing the real world. It is more of an 
analytical tool to understand the formation of prices and the equilibrating nature of 
entrepreneurship. That is, the present Robbinsian allocation is wrong from the point of view 
of an omniscient entrepreneur. The entrepreneurial function ensures this allocation comes 
closer to equilibrium.  
Kirzner also makes a clear distinction between entrepreneurship and resource ownership.  
We must stress that all, but Schumpeter’s theory, views entrepreneurship as an equilibrating 
force. In Austrian theory, the actions taken by individuals are inherently equilibrating, and 
thus entrepreneurship must be so too. This might come as a surprise to those who regard 
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Schumpeter as an Austrian School economist. Schumpeter is not regarded as an Austrian 
economist by contemporary Austrians.   
From these different approaches to entrepreneurship it is not easy to make any conclusions. 
What is clear is that entrepreneurship as future oriented and as a source of change is present 
throughout these descriptions. For now we can conclude that human action itself is 
entrepreneurial as it aims at improving expected utility in the uncertain future.  
However, it still remains to define entrepreneurship in a market economy context. In order to 
do so, we must have a clear definition of the goals of the agents organizing the productive 
process of an economy.  
If relying on Mises’ human action axiom, that humans act to remove felt uneasiness, we 
must define what goal entrepreneurs are aiming at to distinguish them. We will assume that 
in general the goal is to obtain financial profits. However, it still remains to explain what 
exactly profits are.  
 
3.2   Uncertainty, Risk and Profits 
 
To define financial profits Foss & Klein (2012) turn to the works of Frank Knight. Knight 
views profits as a payment for the successful bearing of uncertainty as opposed to risk-
bearing. Risk, according to Knight is what can be measured in a scientific way, while 
uncertainty being that which cannot. Risk can be calculated by acquiring data on a sufficient 
number of similar cases to make an informed estimate of expected losses. Such statistical 
probability, as opposed to a priori probability, is the kind of problem most often encountered 
by businesses (Knight, 1921, 1935, p. 215).  
The risk associated with a particular field of business can then be viewed as a fixed cost. The 
statistical method cannot tell us with certainty what this cost will be in any particular case, 
but given sufficient number of similar cases in a sufficient time space it can give us a good 
estimate. This is of course the basis for insurance.  
The risk-premium paid to an investor, is compensation for expected losses. If we assume no 
change, and thus, no uncertainty about the future, the investor who stays in a particular 
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investment for a sufficient period of time would receive no more than the pure time-
preference interest rate. Given that the risk is calculated correctly, the risk-premium should 
just offset losses over the same period of time, so that the particular investment yields no 
more than other investments. 
In a world that doesn’t change, where the economy has reached equilibrium, there are no 
profits or losses. It is the real world we are interested in and the fact that the real world does 
change, and so do consumer preferences, introduces what Knight terms uncertainty. This is 
an uncertainty about the future. In an economic context, this is uncertainty as to what to 
produce and how to produce it.  
The origin of profits is getting ones predictions right. Likewise, the origin of losses is getting 
them wrong. Since production takes time and the rearrangement of resources as well, the 
businessman must make a prediction today about what consumers will prefer in the future. 
According to Knight, this process of making judgments about the future and bearing 
uncertainty is the essence of entrepreneurship. However, being right or wrong about future 
consumer preferences does not suffice to explain how profits are generated. This judgment 
about the future must necessarily have some physical manifestation.   
Mises (1949/1996) explains the origin of profits as the action taken when an entrepreneur 
believes the market’s expected discounted marginal revenue product (DMRP) of a factor of 
production is less than his own expectation. The entrepreneur anticipating demand for a 
particular good going up in the future, also, by definition, assumes the DMRP of factors of 
production to go into this particular good to be higher. If the market does not share his vision 
of the future, the entrepreneur will be able to buy these factors of production at a discount (in 
the eyes of the entrepreneur). If the entrepreneur’s expectations about the future turn out to 
be right, he will receive a profit. The profit consists of the discrepancies between the factors’ 
price at the time of buying, and what they ought to have been, taking into account what 
future conditions turned out to be. Mises puts it neatly: 
If all entrepreneurs were to anticipate correctly the future state of the market, there would be neither 
profits nor losses. The prices of all the factors of production would already today be fully adjusted to 
tomorrow's prices of the products. In buying the factors of production the entrepreneur would have to 
expend (with due allowance for the difference between the prices of present goods and future goods) 
no less an amount than the buyers will pay him later for the product. An entrepreneur can make a 
profit only if he anticipates future conditions more correctly than other entrepreneurs. Then he buys 
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the complementary factors of production at prices the sum of which is smaller than the price at which 
he sells the product. (Mises, 1949/1996, p. 293) 
Profits are then the result of getting resources to their highest valued uses. As consumer 
demands are constantly changing, entrepreneurial activity must go on perpetually in all 
businesses, if they are to receive profits. Entrepreneurs can then be said to play catch-up with 
an ever changing equilibrium state. Those who get closest to this state receive the biggest 
reward.  
The entrepreneurial activity can be said to be the driving force of the market economy. 
Through profits and loss, ownership of resources is shifted from the less efficient to the more 
efficient entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur’s efficiency is determined by his ability to comply 
with consumer’s wants. The entrepreneur is subject to the sovereignty of consumers (Mises, 
1949/1996).  
While on the topic of profits and loss, it is worthwhile to mention its relevance to economic 
calculation and the socialist calculation debate. Without the feedback mechanism of profits 
and loss, entrepreneurs will not know what the most urgent consumer wants are. If they were 
to guess it correctly, “they would lack the means to adjust production accordingly” (Mises, 
1949/1996, p. 299). This insight is of outmost importance in understanding the workings of a 
market economy and the structural problem of any socialist state or organization not relying 
on private ownership and free exchange.  
The absence of profits and losses makes for economic chaos. This is what happens in a 
socialist economy where there are no market-prices for factors of production. It is the same 
with public sector where service providers are not subject to market forces. Efficient 
allocation of resources is dependent upon the guiding hand of profits and losses.  
This dynamic view of the economy and emphasis on it not ever being in equilibrium implies 
also that there is no such thing as a “normal rate of profit”. eurthermore, “capital does not 
beget profit. Profit and loss are entirely determined by the success or failure of the 
entrepreneur to adjust production to the demand of the consumers,” (Mises, 1949/1996, p. 
297).  
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3.3   Judgment as entrepreneurship 
 
Following the insights of Frank Knight and Ludwig von Mises, Foss and Klein (2012) make 
their case for judgment as the crucial element of entrepreneurship. Following the logic of 
Knight’s theory of profit, the key to obtaining profits is having good judgment about the 
future. The entrepreneur with better judgment will also be the more efficient one.  
This particular form of judgment is based upon what Foss and Klein refers to as tacit 
knowledge. This knowledge can neither be taught nor learned. This is not to say that 
experience and skills do not play their part. The formulation of decision problems, 
imaginative skills, analytical skills and skills at collecting data are useful when trying to 
realize an entrepreneurial venture (Foss & Klein, 2012). However, they are only 
complimentary to judgment. Two persons having the same skills might arrive at two 
different conclusions as a result of this last ingredient, judgment.  
Judgment must not be mistaken for forecasting. Forecasting is a tool, but judgment is 
necessary to interpret the results given by forecasting. Judgment implies making a decision 
in the absence of any clear decision making tool.  
When faced with the problem of dealing with what Mises refers to as case probability or 
cases where one must rely on estimated probability, to use Knight’s term, the entrepreneur 
must form tacit probability estimates (Foss & Klein, 2012). Thus the entrepreneur relies 
upon his judgment where no clear decision rule exists. This is the problem faced when 
allocating current or new resources for satisfying future preferences. The uncertainty facing 
the entrepreneur can only be dealt with trough his good judgment. Since profits are a result 
of the successful bearing of uncertainty and successful bearing of uncertainty relies on good 
judgment, profits are a result of good judgment. Losses, on the other hand, are the result of 
unsuccessful bearing of uncertainty i.e. poor judgment.  
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3.4   The Capitalist-Entrepreneur  
 
We now have defined the essential feature of entrepreneurship as being judgment about the 
future and the successful bearing of uncertainty as the source of profits. It still remains, 
though, to define exactly who the entrepreneur is. As we have mentioned earlier, this view of 
the entrepreneur can be said to apply to all human action. We must clearly define the 
entrepreneur for the purpose of studying entrepreneurship in a Catallactic context. 
When we talk of profits and losses it is financial profits and losses that are of interest. The 
same goes for uncertainty.  
Since decisions cannot be sold or purchased, a market for judgment does not exist. The 
entrepreneur cannot sell judgment (as opposed to advice) and this implies ownership of the 
resources to be allocated towards uncertain ends. In the event an employee allocates 
resources on behalf of the owner, the owner may at his own discretion overrule the 
employee’s decision. If the employee’s salary is dependent on the successful allocation of 
these resources, it is still just compensation reflecting his marginal revenue product. If he is 
performing his task poorly, his labor has a low marginal revenue product in its current use.  
The entrepreneurial judgment was exercised when the owner decided to leave the particular 
resource allocation decision to this employed person’s judgment. In doing so the owner 
might be successful or fail. The outcome is a result of the owner’s organizing of 
heterogeneous resources.   
For the sake of studying the market economy it is the capital-owning entrepreneur we are 
interested in. Rothbard (1962/2001, p. 463) terms this the capitalist-entrepreneur as opposed 
to a pure entrepreneur only making judgments, but who is not in a position to receive profits, 
and the pure capitalist who steers clear of uncertainty and only receives interest on his 
capital. 
It is this notion of the capitalist-entrepreneur, which best describes the controlling agents of 
the production process of the modern economy. To make sense of what goes on in the 
economy, we will view the economy though the capitalist-entrepreneur lens.  
The capitalist-entrepreneur must buy factors of production in the present and the product 
which these are used to produce, must be sold in the future. In order to obtain profits, he 
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must be on the lookout for situations where factors’ DMRP does not reflect their true future 
value i.e. the factors are under-priced.  
If the capitalist-entrepreneur correctly judges the true DMRP of factors he will gain a profit, 
since the market under-prices these factors at the time he buys them. However, once acting 
upon his recognition of this profit opportunity, the result will be a tendency to eliminate 
these profits. As he extends production in this particular process, he will increase demand 
and price of these factors of production. In addition to this, the fact that he receives a profit 
will attract other capitalist-entrepreneurs to the same area. Then the increased demand will 
further raise input-prices and the increased supply will reduce output-prices (Rothbard, 
1962/2001, p. 465).  
This process ensures that resources are allocated to their highest valued uses according to 
consumer preferences. Upon recognizing a profit opportunity, the capitalist-entrepreneur is 
willing to bid resources away from those who employ them for less valued purposes. Losses 
in one process makes sure resources are made available for other processes. Thus, the 
structure of production is synchronized to the highest extent possible with consumer 
preferences through the actions of profit-seeking capitalist-entrepreneurs. The extent to 
which they are able to approach equilibrium is dependent on their judgment, quality and 
availability of information, institutional factors as well as how volatile consumer preferences 
are. Reorganizing the production process takes time and money, so the quicker and cheaper 
it can be reorganized, the better for the economy.  
 
3.5   The entrepreneur and the business cycle   
 
Having a clear definition of the capitalist-entrepreneur (henceforth just entrepreneur) it is 
time to revisit the Austrian business cycle theory. Entrepreneurial mistakes are at the core of 
ABCT and it is useful to elaborate on this now that the entrepreneurial process has been 
discussed.  
Let us, however, first consider Crusoe on his island. In a Crusoe economy, the allocation of 
resources towards the satisfaction of future wants is a trivial problem. Crusoe, having very 
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limited options and naturally a superb knowledge of the islands only consumer’s 
preferences, can easily direct his efforts and resources to their best possible uses.  
In an advanced market economy, the allocation of resources is of course a much more 
complex matter. The entrepreneur can direct his resources to a multitude of uses. To know 
what use is the most valuable, the entrepreneur relies on market prices in the form of units of 
the medium of exchange i.e. money, which enables him to calculate profit and loss as well. 
Thus, money-prices are the basis for economic calculation and the conveyor of information 
regarding the relative value of different resources and the relative value of different uses of 
these resources. The importance of money calculation can hardly be exaggerated.  
Monetary calculation is the guiding star of action under the social system of division of labor. It is 
the compass of the man embarking upon production. He calculates in order to distinguish the 
remunerative lines of production from the unprofitable ones, those of which the sovereign consumers 
are likely to approve from those of which they are likely to disapprove. Every single step of 
entrepreneurial activities is subject to scrutiny by monetary calculation. The premeditation of planned 
action becomes commercial precalculation of expected costs and expected proceeds. The 
retrospective establishment of the outcome of past action becomes accounting of profit and loss. 
(Mises, 1949/1996, p. 229). 
Economic calculation can only be achieved in presence of market prices based on private 
ownership of resources. Private ownership and actual market exchanges are necessary to 
establish prices based on individuals’ subjective value scales. By this we mean that prices 
must be established through voluntary human action. What people think prices should be 
does not suffice, because their answer would be influenced by their own subjective value 
scales. The buyer and seller would surely prefer different prices. The prices of interest are 
the realized prices, which we can obtain by observing actual transactions in the market place.  
Example 3.1 Economic vs. technical calculation 
The classic example used to distinguish economic calculation from technical calculation is 
the case of the engineer and the bridge. An engineer can easily calculate if a bridge can be 
built to cross a particular river. He can calculate how much resources must be spent in its 
production and how much time it will take to finish it. What is achievable with today’s 
resources and technology is a matter of technical calculation through the established sciences 
and units of measures. So in this case the engineer can easily determine whether the bridge 
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can be built or not. However, in order to determine if the bridge should be built, we rely on 
economic calculation and the consideration of alternative cost.
4
  
So to allocate resources economically the entrepreneur must rely on market prices in the 
form of money. In a free market place these prices are determined by three factors: the 
supply of a resource, the demand for a resource and the purchasing power of money. 
Changes in prices can come about through changes in any of these three factors.  
Relevant to the efficient allocation of resources are the real changes in the supply and 
demand of particular resources. Price changes induced by a lower or higher purchasing 
power of money can come about by a change in demand or supply of money itself, and are 
not reflecting any real changes in resource availability. Such changes introduce noise in 
economic calculation.  
It is clear then, that such changes in prices will result in the misallocation of resources if they 
are not accounted for by the entrepreneur. ABCT states that market prices are distorted by 
the actions taken by monetary authorities. A monetary expansion will result in a lower 
interest rate, but also Cantillon-effects depending on how the money enters the economy. 
Such actions will therefore lead entrepreneurs astray.  
A common criticism of the ABCT is that it takes entrepreneurs to be stupid. Entrepreneurs 
familiar with economics and the operations of the central bank will not be led astray by 
temporarily reduced interest rates. While this might be true in the case of interest rates it is 
not so in the case of Cantillon-effects which can exist in multiple places in the economy and 
with different intensities. In any case, it is not a simple job to accurately predict when 
interests will rise again nor is it easy to determine the relevant price deflator for any 
particular good. eigure 3.1 shows the Norwegian central bank’s interest rate projections 
compared to the actual rate. Predicting future rates does not look like an easy task, even for 
those who control it. In the absence of policy induced bubbles and busts, one might expect it 
to be less of a concern.  
                                                 
4 We find it amazing how often this lesson is neglected in modern societies, particularly in the spheres of government.    
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Figure  3.1 Interest rate projections and actual key policy rates. (Nettavisen, 2010) 
According to the Austrian school, the general inflation of the money supply and rise in the 
CPI are not made insignificant by the mere expectations of these changes by entrepreneurs 
and consumers. As long as the interest rate is hampered with, entrepreneurs can never know 
what the interest rate should really be. It is not simply a question about if and when interest 
rates will rise. Furthermore, adjusting for inflation is not as simple as employing the CPI-
deflator to any good’s price. eollowing the logic of Cantillon-effects, each and every good 
has its very own deflator.  
Example 3.2  Expectations and inflation 
Consider an engineer in his workshop. What if we were to manipulate his measuring tools so 
that the centimeters on his rulers became smaller every year? Furthermore, we made 
kilograms a bit lighter, his scales showing a smaller number as time went by. Conventional 
economic theory will have us believe that as long as the engineer knows the rate at which his 
measuring tools are changing, he will still be able to perform the necessary calculations. 
However, this example needs some modifications. Let us rather say that his measuring tools 
shrink at an average rate 2.5 % every year. This leaves the possibility that some of the tools 
are not shrinking and some might even be getting bigger. In such chaos only the crudest of 
constructions could be realized.  
Our analogy might leave much to be desired, but it illustrates the crucial point of ABCT. 
Monetary expansion leads to the general decay of entrepreneurs’ most important decision-
making tool; monetary calculation based on market prices.  
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We must emphasize that any medium of exchange is capable of introducing noise to 
economic calculation. Perfect money would be something that never changed value in the 
eyes of humans, so that any change in the market prices was due to real changes in supply 
and demand of the goods and services themselves. Such money is unrealizable. Still the 
critique of monetary authorities stands, since any price which is not the result of voluntary 
market exchange must simply be regarded as the wrong price and not fit for economic 
calculation.  
The entrepreneur faced with the distorted market-prices induced by a monetary authority has 
a hard time deciding where to allocate his resources. Even if he knows prices to be inflated 
in a particular field of the economy, he might convince himself to invest there. If he can get 
out in time, which is before the inflation stops, there might be huge profits to be secured. In 
modern times, authorities have introduced further moral hazards by bailing out these 
entrepreneurs; ensuring resources stay in the hands of unsuccessful gamblers.  
According to ABCT, the reluctance of both monetary authorities and governments to allow 
the economy to rearrange its capital structure when monetary expansions are halted; ensures 
a prolonged state of economic recession. The actions taken, such as further monetary 
expansion and the bailing out of failed businesses are futile attempts to preserve a capital 
structure not in synch with consumer preferences. On top of this, it ensures that resource 
ownership stays in the hands of those who have proven their incompetence, prohibiting 
successful entrepreneurs in attaining ownership of these resources.  
 
3.6   Conclusions on the entrepreneur 
 
We now have a clear definition of the entrepreneur as an uncertainty-bearing decision-maker 
relying on his own judgment and monetary calculation based on market prices, to best 
allocate resources between different uses and intertemporally. The entrepreneur’s goal is to 
make profits in the catallactic sense, and this is achieved when resources are bought at a 
price lower than their true DMRP. The entrepreneurial process can then be summed up as the 
following: 
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1. Market disequilibrium 
The market is in disequilibrium due to ever changing consumer preferences. This 
implies the presence of profit opportunities. 
2. Judgment 
Relying on his judgment and limited information, an individual decides what action 
best suited to bring the market closer to equilibrium and thereby realizing a profit.  
3. Allocation of resources 
If the individual decides to act, he must allocate resources in order to realize potential 
profits. This involves changing the structure of production. The individual now 
becomes an entrepreneur, putting his own resources at stake.  
4. Market test 
After the allocation of resources is made, the market test will decide if the 
entrepreneur’s investment is profitable or not.   
5. Equilibrating forces 
If the entrepreneur is successful, his investment will not be liquidated and the profits 
he receives will promote more of the same investment. If unsuccessful, the 
investment must be liquidated, so that resources are freed up for other uses. This 
brings the market closer to equilibrium.  
This must be understood as a continuous process, going on indefinitely. The economy is then 
never truly in equilibrium, just more or less in disequilibrium. An economic crisis might then 
also be described as when the market suddenly realizes that the equilibrium position is far 
away from where it was believed to be.  
To clarify the possible exception when an entrepreneur is willing to forego financial profits 
for the sake of some other preferred reward (e.g. charity or the ability to produce something 
of personal interest) it must be pointed out that profits in the form of money is just a mean 
for realizing ends. To the extent an entrepreneur is willingly foregoing a better investment 
opportunity he is subsidizing his current investment. He actually becomes a consumer and 
uses his money to uphold a structure of production, not sustainable where it not for his own 
specific preference for consuming the products or services rendered by this specific process. 
When an entrepreneur stops targeting financial profits, and let his own personal preferences 
determine where to invest, he is really increasing his consumption. The specific investment 
made on these grounds can only be sustained as long as the entrepreneur can direct profits 
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from other investments to sustaining this unprofitable investment. The question is if such an 
investment should be called entrepreneurial. If the entrepreneur knows that the investment 
only can survive with him subsidizing it, and he is intent on doing so, there is no uncertainty 
involved, and hence it is not entrepreneurial. In this sense only profit seeking individuals can 
be said to be entrepreneurs. It can be argued that there exists uncertainty as to if the non-
financial goals, whatever they might be, of the investor will be realized. But this uncertainty 
is outside the boundaries of catallactics.  
To sum up, we regard only the profit-seeking investor as an entrepreneur and that 
entrepreneurial judgment is judgment about the allocation of future use of resources. In 
contrast to the mainstream understanding of entrepreneurship, we view entrepreneurship not 
as the starting of new businesses, but as an ongoing process that must be present in any firm 
if it is to survive. Furthermore, we view entrepreneurship as an equilibrating force, bringing 
the economy forward in its chase for profits.  
 
4.   The theory of the firm 
4.1   Why the firm? 
 
The question remains as to why the economy is organized in the manner it is, consisting of 
firms, owners and employees. We can imagine the production processes of an economy still 
going on in an economy consisting of a multitude of independent, self-employed individuals 
contracting with each other. We will offer two complementary explanations as to why the 
economy’s production processes is organized in this way.  
 
4.1.1 Ronald Coase and the transaction costs view 
Ronald Coase (1937) seeks to explain the emergence and boundaries of the firm through 
agents economizing on transaction costs. The distinguishing mark of the firm is assumed to 
be “… the supersession of the price mechanism,” (ibid. p. 389). Coase points to the fact that 
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organizing production merely through the price mechanism involves costs of discovering 
what the relevant prices are and negotiating separate contracts for every exchange 
transaction.  
These costs, according to Coase, cannot be eliminated completely, but can be greatly 
reduced by organizing production within a firm. The multitude of contracts necessary for the 
owner of a factor of production to cooperate with other factor owners, are substituted for one 
single contract. Coase points out that the character of the contracts substituted is of a nature 
where a factor of production enters a firm for a fixed or fluctuating remuneration and agrees 
to obey the entrepreneur within certain limits. In contrast, were the entrepreneur to obtain 
ownership of this factor, there is no remuneration or limits to the factor’s use.  
Furthermore, Coase argues that there may be a desire to make long term contracts to avoid 
certain costs incurred with the making of each new contract. It may also be preferable to 
make long rather than short-term contracts due to the risk attitude of the parties concerned. 
However, the making of such contracts is made difficult due to the problems of forecasting.  
When the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur’s judgment instead of the 
price mechanism, a firm can be said to exist. Within the scope of this firm, costs that would 
otherwise emerge due to the use of market exchange contracts, otherwise known as 
transaction cost, will be eliminated.  
Based on the economizing on transaction costs, Coase is able to explain why the firm 
emerges. But the question remains as to why there does not emerge one giant firm; 
eliminating all transaction costs. To answer why firms do not keep growing, despite the 
promise of monopoly gains and reduction in marketing costs and transaction costs, Coase 
suggests that the two following arguments are the most probable.  
First, there might be that the cost of organizing additional transactions within the firm might 
be rising. If so, there must be a point where the organizing of one additional transaction 
within the firm equals the cost involved by carrying it out in the market place. Secondly, 
there is the possibility that when transactions are organized, the entrepreneur fails to allocate 
factors of production to their most valued uses. Again there would be a point where the 
benefits of organizing transactions within the firm would be outweighed by the loss incurred 
through wasteful use of resources. This second argument resembles the argument Mises 
makes in his critique of socialism.  
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With regards to the explanation of firm size as dependent on its cost curve, Coase argues that 
as long as more than one product can be produced, there is no reason why an upward sloping 
cost curve should limit the size of the firm.  
It is worthwhile to elaborate on what exactly is meant by firm size when talking of 
transaction costs. When organizing transaction costs within a firm, it is the transactions 
otherwise made upstream or downstream from the firm which are in question, also known as 
backward and forward integration. So the size in question is how much of a particular 
production process is organized in one firm. To help visualize this, it is useful to revisit the 
Austrian capital structure.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the total intertemporal production structure of tires sold to a specific 
market. Consider a business selling tires to consumers in the last stage of triangle. If the 
entrepreneur controlling this business believes it to be economical to organize the 
transactions with the distributer and producer of the tires, he can merge with or buy these 
businesses. By doing so he is increasing the intertemporal size of the firm.  
If, on the other hand, he were to increase the size of his firm by selling more tires, the 
increased size of the firm does not automatically imply organizing more transactions. It is 
then a question of scale. Transaction costs can of course be dependent on scale if increased 
scale necessitates an increased number of contracts. This again might make it more 
economical to integrate if such an assumption is made. Figure 4.2 shows cost of organizing 
and cost of transactions depending on number of contracts necessary to realize a certain 
production level in a specific business.  
 
Figure  4.1 Increase in intertemporal firm size. 
 65 
 
Figure  4.2 Organizing and transaction costs. 
For this particular business small scale production does not qualify for further integration of 
transactions, but as production rise so does transaction cost. Since organizing costs rise at a 
slower rate at first, there is a point where further integration becomes economical. However, 
at one point the marginal cost of integrating one more transaction becomes higher than the 
cost of making this transaction in the market place. At this point further integration is not 
economical. In the discrete and discontinuous real world it is of course a much harder task to 
find this optimum.  
The determination of a firm’s vertical boundary based on transaction and organizing costs is 
a theory which has received much attention since Coase’s seminal analysis from 1937. 
However, we contend that even though Coase’s analysis goes a long way in describing one 
aspect of the firm, economizing on transaction costs, it does not sufficiently answer why the 
firm emerges.  
Coase’s argument rests on the notion that production processes could be carried out in the 
absence of firms. Although this may be true, it leaves the question of how these production 
processes could ever come about. Who organized these production processes and how were 
they paid?  
In a world of uncertainty, the organizing of production processes involves putting resources 
at stake. Even if this organizing service could be purchased in the market place, it is not clear 
who the buyer is or what the organizer should be paid.  
We find that the notion of transaction costs describes one of a firm’s functions, but does not 
answer the essential question of why firms emerge. If transaction costs are the decisive 
factor leading to the formation of firms, there should be no need for firm creation in a world 
of no transaction costs. However, in a world with no transaction costs there still is the 
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problem of organizing and experimenting with new production processes, and how this 
process will come about. We find Coase’s theory to be insufficient in this regard.  
 
4.1.2 The Austrian theory of the firm 
 
From an Austrian perspective the emergence of firms must be explained by the actions taken 
by market participants and their motives for doing so. Foss and Klein (2012) argues that in 
general, agent may realize returns from their human capital through three means: 1) Selling 
labor services on market conditions; 2) entering into employment contract; or 3) starting a 
firm. For a person whose services are difficult to measure, option 1) and 2) are inefficient 
means for realizing these returns. The person whose services are of this kind, becomes “… 
an entrepreneur, employing and supervising other agents, and committing capital of his own 
to the venture, thus contributing a bond” (ibid. p. 164).   
Foss et al. (2006) argues that when entrepreneurial judgment is complementary to resources, 
it makes sense for the entrepreneur to own these resources, since entrepreneurial judgment is 
costly to trade. The notion that entrepreneurial judgment is costly to trade follows the logic 
of Knightian profits and uncertainty. After all, the entrepreneur believes himself to be right 
and everyone else to be wrong about current and future prices. If the entrepreneur is 
confident in his judgment about the future, it makes sense for him to acquire ownership of 
these complimentary resources in order to capture the profits he believes he can realize.   
Knight (1921, 1935) makes the argument that in the case where the reward is uncertain, as 
with profits, a person would not willingly accept to be directed in his efforts without some 
guaranteed reward. This can be said to be the case with entrepreneurial judgment. In order to 
exercise his judgment to the full extent, the entrepreneur must have complete control of the 
resources required.   
In order to exercise his judgment, the entrepreneur must have control, and in order to have 
control he must have ownership. The firm can then be viewed as “the entrepreneur and the 
assets he owns, and ultimately controls” (Foss & Klein, 2004). The theory of the firm is 
then: 
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essentially a theory of how the entrepreneur exercises his judgmental decision-making – what 
combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to 
subordinates, how will he provide incentives and employ monitoring to see that his assets are used 
consistently with his judgment, and so on. (ibid. p. 8-9).  
The firm is an extension of the entrepreneur himself; the physical manifestation of his 
judgment.  
The emergence of firms can then be explained by the lack of complete markets for judgment, 
necessitating that the individual invests and bears uncertainty on his own. Since optimal uses 
of assets cannot be known ex ante, Foss et al. (2006) makes the argument that 
entrepreneurial activity has a need for controlled experiments in order to uncover how 
capital and resources are best applied. If so, the system must be isolated from outside 
disturbances and controlled in some way, necessitating the formation of a firm. 
These arguments go a long way in explaining the emergence of firms, but it remains to 
explain the boundaries of the firm.  
We have previously touched upon the argument put forth by Mises, and elaborated upon by 
Rothbard, regarding economic calculation in a socialist system. The argument is that in order 
to perform economic calculations it is necessary to have a functioning market for capital 
goods as well as consumer goods. This is the basis for calculating profits and loss. In the 
absence of a market for capital goods, such as in a socialist state, it is impossible to perform 
economic calculation since profits and losses cannot be determined.  
As a firm grows bigger the use of internally traded intermediate goods, for which no external 
market reference exists, “…introduces distortions that reduce organizational efficiency” 
(Klein, 1999, p. 28). This imposes an upper limit for firm size as economic calculation and 
efficient allocation of resources becomes impossible. As Klein points out:  
“Central planning” within the firm, then, is possible only when the firm exists within a larger market 
setting (ibid). 
An historic example of this might be the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can be understood 
as giant firm existing in a global economy. The fact that there existed many open markets for 
goods outside the Soviet Union gave the Soviets proxies for how they should price resources 
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within their own system. Without these external markets we can assume that the Soviet 
Union would have collapsed much sooner.  
We clearly see that there is an opposing force to the benefits of organizing transactions 
within a firm and the attainment of property rights to resources. However, to further explore 
firm size it is necessary to revise to textbook model of the firm from the capitalist-
entrepreneur point of view, which will be done in section 4.2.  
From an Austrian perspective we can conclude that the firms emerge as a mean for 
entrepreneurs to realize returns to their judgment. When judgment is complimentary to a 
resource it makes sense for the entrepreneur to own this resource. This can be understood as 
a sort of horizontal integration of his judgment and the resource. In the event judgment is 
sold on the market as advice, or a person is hired by an entrepreneur in an advisory role, the 
entrepreneurial judgment is still performed by the resource owner in accepting or rejecting 
these advices.  
In world of Knightian uncertainty, entrepreneurial activity also involves putting resources at 
stake and whoever owns these resources is exposed to potential losses. The immeasurable, 
and hence uninsurable, nature of uncertainty suggests that the resource owner must have the 
same expectations as whoever controls his resources, or at least partially. If the resource 
owner has expectations he will allocate his resources accordingly, or he might hire someone 
whose judgment he deems better suited for allocating his resources. In both instances the 
resource owner ends up as the entrepreneur.   
 
4.2   An entrepreneurial model of the firm 
 
The Austrian theory of the firm establishes the firm as an extension of the entrepreneur, or 
rather the capitalist-entrepreneur, but it still remains to investigate if this alternative theory 
has any implications whatsoever. To do this we rely on the standard production model of the 
firm in micro-economics, as this serves as a useful heuristic tool although not perfect.  
The standard production function model of the firm is one with severe limitations with 
regards to the real world. Coase (1937) makes the point that with regards to firm size this 
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model assumes an upward sloping cost curve to be the limiting factor. However, this 
assumes that only one product can be produced. A firm can of course engage in many such 
production functions, maximizing ROI, and the model as such cannot have practical 
significance in determining firm size, according to Coase.  
Gabor and Pearce (1952) make a similar argument as Coase with regards to there being more 
than one investment opportunity and this having an effect on output. Furthermore, they make 
the case for adjusting the model to reflect real accounting principles where returns to capital 
or dividends are not treated as a cost. They also argue for a maximization of ROI rather than 
profit-maximization and point out how ownership structures can affect level of output.  
Klein (1999) adopts Gabor and Pearce’s ownership perspective where the firm is recognized 
as an investment. In this case, the firm’s objective is to maximize return on invested capital. 
Money capital in this view is not simply regarded as a factor of production and a cost to the 
producer. Money capital in this view is regarded as a unique factor of production, or rather a 
controlling factor of production as opposed to land, labor and physical capital as contracting 
factors. These contracting factors receive a fixed or agreed upon payment, while the 
controlling factor receives the net proceeds of the operation. The efficient scale of 
productions is then determined by factors outside the firm, such as other investment 
opportunities and availability of money capital. It is the entrepreneur who, through his 
allocation of money capital, determines the level of output of the firm and hence the 
corresponding product price.  
A model of the firm building on Austrian principles must then have capital as a scarce and 
limiting factor, a controlling factor of production. The contracting factors of production 
going into a production process are the physical manifestation of the fact that financial 
capital was allocated for this purpose.  
 
4.3   ROI vs. Profits 
 
The basic premise for the standard production-function view of the firm is that the manager, 
or whoever controls this decision, wants to maximize absolute profits. This is given by the 
adaptation of marginal revenue equals marginal cost solution. One critique of this model is 
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that this might be assuming too much, and that maximizing return on investment (ROI) is a 
more correct way of looking at output decisions. For now we will show how these two 
different approaches result in different outputs and later we will discuss how ownership 
structures and uncertainty might also affect output levels.  
 
Example 4.1 ROI vs. Profits 
Figure 4.3 shows a basic model of the firm consisting the demand curve, marginal revenue 
curve and marginal cost curve. In this particular case, assume that costs reflect how costs are 
actually accounted for. Profits are that which is left for the owners after everyone else have 
been paid. Also assume that this firm is one hundred percent financed by its owner.  
 
Figure  4.3 Marginal cost and marginal revenue 
 
The graphs are given by the following formulas:  
Price = 100-0,5Q  Revenue = 100Q-0,5Q
2
  Marginal revenue = 100-Q  
Total Cost = 40Q+0,5Q
2
+500 Marginal cost = 40+Q  
As we can see from the figure 4.3 these formulas give us a profit maximizing solution when 
the firm is producing 30 units and selling at a price of 85.  
Now consider the fact that to carry out this production a certain fixed investment is needed in 
addition to outlays for materials and labor. From this we can construct a capital requirement 
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function. We assume all inputs are bought at t=0 and outputs sold at t=1. The capital 
requirement function includes the outlays for total cost and a fixed investment of 500. 
Capital requirement = 40Q+0,5Q
2
+1000 
If instead of maximizing profits, the owner wants to maximize ROI, we get a solution where 
Q = 24,75 and ROI = 16,22 % and a price of 87,625 as opposed to the profit maximizing 
solution where Q = 30 and ROI = 15,09 %. Figure 4.4 shows these two different solutions.  
 
Figure  4.4 Return on investment 
 
 
As example 4.1 shows us, our assumptions about the entrepreneur’s goal has impact on 
output and price. The difference between the solutions depends on the specific nature of the 
firm, or rather production process, at hand. Note that the less capital needed for sustaining a 
given production level, that is; inputs and outputs are purchased and sold more than once 
between t=0 and t=1, the smaller the difference becomes. This is shown in figure 4.5.  
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Figure  4.5 ROI with low and high turnover 
The ultimate controlling factor for a given project is the opportunity cost of the capital 
needed for any output level. This can be modeled simply by including this opportunity cost 
of capital in the cost formula for the particular production process as in the standard model. 
However, opportunity cost is not known ex ante, so this is not a realistic procedure. If we 
assume the entrepreneur has a multitude of different projects to invest in and a limited 
amount of capital, it makes sense for him to maximize expected ROI on his portfolio of 
investments.  
Example 4.2 Investing with a capital budget  
We will now consider an entrepreneur with a capital budget of W=1600 and two investment 
projects P1 and P2. To maximize profits the entrepreneur must maximize ROI on a portfolio 
consisting of both projects.  
P1 is given by:  Price=100-0,5Q Total cost=80Q 
   Capital Requirement= 80Q 
The profit maximizing solution for P1 is Q1=20 P1=90 and Profits=200 
P2 is given by:  Price=50-0,5Q Total cost=45Q 
   Capital Requirement=45Q 
The profit maximizing solution for P2 is Q2=5 P2=47,5 and Profits=12,5 
However, in order to maximize profits with a limited budget, the entrepreneur must 
maximize ROI. In this case, with a budget of 1600, the solution is approximately: 
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Q1=18 and P1=91 Q2=3,4 and P2=48,3  Combined Profits=209  
ROI=13,0625% 
Neither of the projects adapts a profit maximizing solution individually, even though the 
capital budget is sufficient for such a solution in either P1 or P2.  
 
Considering example 4.2 there is by no means certain that production processes will adapt a 
profit maximizing solution. The choice of output must always be seen in context of capital 
limitations and optional investments.  
Gabor and Pearce (1952) also point out that the particular ownership structure of firm may 
impose limitations on what output level is chosen. We will borrow their example: 
 
Example 4.3 Partnership 
Consider a partnership of two individuals. Each receives a share of profits in proportion to 
capital subscribed. Suppose the capital of the firm is £5,000; £2,000 of A`s and £3,000 of 
B`s. Suppose also profit amounts to 6 per cent. of the capital per annum and the competitive 
rate is 2 per cent. only. Imagine that the introduction of another £2,000 capital is expected to 
reduce the rate on the whole to 5 per cent. If A subscribes £800 and B £1,200, there is no 
conflict of interest. The £800 will earn 5 per cent. less £20 (i.e. 1 per cent. on A`s original 
£2,000), which gives a marginal rate of  
 
 
 per cent. Similarly the £1,200 will earn 5 per 
cent. less £30 (1 per cent. on £3,000), i.e.  
 
 
 per cent. It is clearly in the interests of both A 
and B to expand the business. But if the whole of the £2,000 is to be subscribed by B, then A 
will be the loser. There will be an obvious conflict of interest. If A where to subscribe £667, 
this sum would earn 5 per cent. less  £20, i.e. 2 per cent., which is the alternative rate. He 
would neither gain nor lose. If he subscribes less he is the loser, if more, he gains. If the 
£2,000 were raised by the introduction of a new partner, both A and B lose. We are led to 
conclude that in such circumstances shares are likely to be sold at a premium. (Gabor & 
Pearce, 1952, p. 263) 
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In such circumstances as in the example made by Gabor and Pearce, the obvious solution is 
to borrow money at the competitive rate. However, this assumes that the firm in question is 
able to borrow money at a rate lower than the expected return from expanded production.  
We must also consider the individual entrepreneur’s time preference. It might be that the 
ROI when maximizing profits is not sufficient for the entrepreneur to prefer future over 
present consumption.  
Furthermore, in the previous we have treated demand and production costs as given. In the 
real world both demand and production costs are uncertain and based on the entrepreneur’s 
expectations. The entrepreneur knows there is an element of uncertainty to his own 
expectations. The expected return to his investment must therefore be of such magnitude as 
to offset his anxiety of being wrong. If so, it would surely be preferable to go for a ROI 
maximizing solution rather than a profit maximizing solution. In a world of uncertainty it is 
expected returns which are governing the entrepreneur’s actions.  
With regards to uncertainty, the particular firm’s organization might also affect the level of 
output. We can imagine a traditional firm relying on a push-strategy to be more exposed to 
uncertainty and a modern firm relying on a pull-strategy to be less exposed. The 
entrepreneur’s compensation for uncertainty must be seen in context of potential losses. 
Adapting an ROI solution gives the entrepreneur more assurance and less exposure to 
uncertainty.  
The entrepreneurial model of the firm, based on Austrian economics, is not a simple 
mathematical exposition with a definite solution. Although mathematical constructs are good 
heuristic tools, one must not forget the multitude of factors playing a role in firm operation 
in the real world. The assumption that firms want to maximize profits by adopting a 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost solution is, frankly, too much of an assumption. We 
contend that an entrepreneur may have many motivations for doing what he does, but that in 
general his goal is to maximize the return on his investment.  
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5.   Management  
5.1   Managing for profits  
 
The overall goal of business management is maximizing the return the owners, or capitalist-
entrepreneurs, get on their investment. This must be seen as maximizing profits for a given 
investment. To do so the firm must maximize its inputs’ discounted marginal revenue 
product, from the firm’s perspective. The purpose of different managerial approaches can all 
be seen in relation to the notion of DMRP.  
The discounting element of DMRP implies that time and risk plays a role in maximizing it. 
If an entrepreneur is able to reduce the time necessary to convert an input to a consumable 
output, the time dimension of the discounting is reduced as well. In the case where there is a 
risk that inputs will not make it to the consumer (e.g. bursting champagne bottles, inefficient 
production lines) there is opportunity to improve profits by eliminating the sources of the 
risk.  
The revenue product realized from the outputs can be increased through entrepreneurial 
activity. By finding new and more valuable uses for inputs, the firm can increase the relative 
value of outputs to inputs. This can also be done through marketing.  
By employing new technology the DMRP of inputs can be increased when less of any input 
is needed for the same output, or when the technology enables a firm to produce a more 
valuable product from the same resources.   
However, it is not enough to simply increase inputs DMRP. The firm must also be able to 
capture this increase for its owners. This involves attaining ownership rights and a good 
bargaining position towards input owners. Thus, it becomes clear that the firm must increase 
its share, as well. This can either be done by attaining ownership through vertical integration, 
taking steps to better their bargaining positing, or increasing their share by increasing the 
DMRP itself, while the market price for the input stays the same.   
From our discussion it is clear that a particular firm should chose a strategy reflecting its 
specific situation and possibilities to increase its share of inputs’ DMRP.  
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5.2   Delegation of decision rights 
 
A common theme in modern management approaches is trying to emulate the market place 
within the firm. By delegating decision rights to managers and providing incentives like 
bonuses or profit sharing, firms are trying to generate the high powered incentives of the 
market place.  
In doing so, the firm or its owners, are encouraging “intrapreneurship”, a form of internal 
entrepreneurial activity, engaged in by the firms’ employees. To foster such entrepreneurial 
attitudes and behavior, managers must give employees significant discretion (Foss & Klein, 
2012). However, this involves challenges when it comes to measuring and rewarding 
employees efforts. There is a chance that providing incentives for those tasks that can be 
measured at low cost, twist efforts away from tasks that are costly to measure (ibid).  
From an Austrian perspective the delegation of decision rights and construction of incentives 
must be seen as entrepreneurial activity conducted by the owner of the firm. Although 
employees may have decision rights, these are not ultimate. The owner of the firm may at his 
own discretion overrule decisions made by an employee. The entrepreneurial action was 
made when the owner of the firm decided to combine his resources with the mind and labor 
of an employee, in order to maximize inputs’ DMRP. The challenge of getting the right 
employee for the right job is a matter of combining complimentary resources.  
To provide incentives for employees with regards to experimental activity and increasing the 
firm’s net returns, should not just be seen as aligning the interests of the owner and the 
employee. As jobs become more complex, there are increasing difficulties in making a 
contract stipulating the tasks the employee is expected to do. Furthermore, it might be more 
difficult to measure the results of an employee’s efforts. Consider the worker standing at a 
factory production line in contrast to a manager responsible for the whole factory.  
In dealing with employees it is harder to assert the DMRP of their efforts and their potential. 
Employees cannot be owned, and the firm owner does not have the same power to control 
and measure their contribution as he may with his own capital. The owner cannot know the 
full potential of his employees. Experimenting through ever increasing contractual 
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arrangements would be prohibitively costly. In order to realize an employee’s full DMRP the 
employee must be incentivized to realize it on his own.  
In the case where an employee has a fixed income and clearly defined tasks, as stipulated by 
a contract, he has limited incentives to make efforts beyond what is expected by the owner 
and according to contract. There exist, of course, the incentive of getting a promotion, but 
this might not suffice to make him realize his full potential. He need only be better than the 
rest.  
To make employees realize their full potential, it is necessary to share with them the extra 
return generated, either in the form of money or some other way. The employee finds 
himself in the same situation as the owner. The owner would not invest in increasing the 
DMRP of inputs, if he expects he cannot capture a sufficient share of this increase for 
himself. The employee will not make the effort to increase his own DMRP if it only benefits 
the owner. 
 
5.3   Vertical integration 
 
One of the basic arguments for vertical integration is to avoid the problem of double 
marginalization. This is based on the standard micro-economic model of the firm, where 
deviation from the competitive level creates deadweight losses. Once again we want to stress 
that the firm must be seen through the eyes of the capitalist-entrepreneur. Assuming the 
entrepreneur wants to maximize ROI it is not clear if vertical integration is preferred.  
 
Example 5.1  ROI in vertical integration 
Consider this typical textbook example of two independent firms, upstream and downstream, 
who each have market power.  
Price is given by:   P=12-Q 
Firm 1: Total cost=4Q  Marginal cost=4  
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Wholesale price when Firm 1 wants to maximize profits then becomes W=8 
Firm 2:  Total cost=8Q  Marginal cost=8 
Retail price when firm 2 wants to maximize profits the becomes P=10 and Q=2 
Industry profits then becomes 12 instead of 16 as it would have been if there was only one 
firm.  
Consider now that each firm has a capital requirement function consisting of outlays and 
fixed investments.  
CR1=4Q+50  CR2=WQ+70 
Both firms adopt a ROI maximizing solution.   
Firm 1 wants to sell  Q=3,5 at price W=8,5  
Firm 2 then reacts by adapting the solution Q=1,6 and P=10,4 
Firm 1 realizes a ROI of 12,76 % and firm 2 realizes a ROI of 3,64 % 
If these two firms where now to integrate and become one firm, the ROI maximizing 
solution would be: 
Q=3,76 and the owners would realize a ROI of 11,8 %.  
Example 5.1 shows a situation where the upstream firm does not gain, in terms of ROI, by 
integrating. This is caused by the specifics of each company with regards to their margins 
and capital structure. If we adjusted the example, it might very well be that a merger would 
be beneficial in terms of ROI. The point to be made is that this is by no means a certainty.  
Though the argument for double marginalization does not necessarily hold true, there might 
be other benefits with vertical integration. Historically, firms have integrated to gain control 
of scarce resources and can thereby reduce uncertainty regarding critical inputs. 
Furthermore, vertical integration eases the synchronization of supply and demand along the 
chain of products.  
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From an Austrian perspective, capturing DMRP is the main argument for integration as well. 
Foss and Klein (2012) argues that the most critical goal of vertical integration is that of 
capturing returns from relationship specific investments. In the event a downstream firm 
makes an investment increasing the DMRP of its inputs, the supplier of these inputs might 
want a higher price. To the extent the upstream firm has market power; it is able to reap the 
benefits of the downstream investment. For the downstream firm, vertical integration 
becomes a tool for protecting its profits in such an event.  
Lu and Tao (2008) finds that vertical integration among Chinese manufacturing firms has a 
negative impact on firm sales, market share and productivity, but a positive impact on 
product prices. Their findings suggest there are more benefits to vertical specialization due to 
economies of scale. A study by Silke and Lederman (2008) on the American airline industry 
found that large network carriers which are integrated with their regional partners perform 
systematically better than non-integrated carriers.  
The different findings of these two research papers suggest the decision of vertical 
integration is a complex one, where every aspect of the firm must be taken into account. 
Different forces are at play in different situations. Austrian economic theory can only help us 
keep our eye on the target.   
 
5.4   Horizontal integration 
 
With regards to horizontal integration, the same Austrian principle of maximizing DMRP 
applies. Through horizontal integration a firm may achieve synergies through economies of 
scale. The stronger bargaining position it may achieve, increases the share of value added the 
firm may capture, both with regards to customers and suppliers. However, all aspects of a 
firm must be evaluated to make sure two firms are compatible. The ex post bargaining 
position may not outweigh other forces generating inefficiencies. Austrian economics cannot 
provide a definite decision rule in such cases.  
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5.5   Production processes 
 
Finally, we would like to suggest the use of the Hayekian triangle for heuristic purposes in 
understanding production processes. The Hayekian triangle depicts a production process 
with regards to time and value added. 
Figure 5.1 shows a production process consisting of two work stations (W1 and W2) taking 
equal amount of time to perform their tasks. All inputs are bought at t0 and sold at t4. There 
is a time gap between the work stations in which intermediate goods are stored for later use 
in workstation 2. We assume these intermediate goods to have a market value so we are able 
to establish the value added of this process. During time in storage and in inventory there is 
an opportunity cost to be accounted for, hence the downward sloping line reflecting the loss 
of value from the owner’s perspective. The opportunity cost is at play in all time periods, but 
are clearly shown in period t1 to t2 and t3 to t4. The relevant Hayekian triangle for the whole 
production process is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure  5.1 Production process 
 
Figure  5.2 Hayekian triangle of complete production process 
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The complete production process depicted as a Hayekian triangle shows us the relevant 
added value accruing to the owner of the firm. Due to the time spent in inventory the firm 
does not realize the full potential of the market. 
Now, assume the firm is able to adapt a pull-strategy for its production line, so that all goods 
are sold at t3. Figure 5.3 show the relevant Hayekian triangle for this process. Note the 
steeper slope of the hypotenuse, symbolizing that value is added at a quicker pace.  
 
Figure  5.3 Hayekian triangle and pull-strategy. 
However, there still remains the wasteful element of storage between t1 and t2. We now 
assume the firm adopts a just-in-time production process, eliminating the time in storage. 
Figure 5.4 shows the new Hayekian triangle with an even steeper hypotenuse.  
The slope of the hypotenuse represent the ROI and the steeper the better. We have here 
shown two different methods for improving ROI for the same inputs and outputs. The origin 
of this improvement is the decreased opportunity cost resulting from the reduced time it 
takes from production initiation and consumption/sale, which results in a lower discounting 
and less capital outlays.    
 
Figure  5.4 Hayekian triangle with pull-strategy and just-in-time. 
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6.   Conclusions  
 
6.1   Conclusions on research questions 
 
Our aim has been to present Austrian economic theory and its explanation of 
entrepreneurship as an inherent phenomenon in the market economy. We have built our 
analysis on the contribution of many Austrian school economists as well as contributions 
from others. We asked two questions and it now remains to answer these.  
Can Austrian economic theory help us understand entrepreneurship better than 
conventional economic theory? 
We find that the Austrian theoretical framework gives us a holistic and logically coherent 
theory of entrepreneurship. By putting the individual human actor at the center of economic 
research, one is able to deduce a theory explaining entrepreneurship, as well as the 
emergence of firms. In line with the Austrian methodology we see how economic 
phenomena spring out from individual human action; entrepreneurship and the emergence of 
firms being results of this.  
The Austrian theory of the intertemporal capital structure and real uncertainty about the 
future helps us understand why human action and its outcomes take the particular form they 
do. This also helps us explain such phenomena as business cycles from an entrepreneurial 
point of view, as well as the origins of profit and economic growth. We also find the 
Hayekian triangle as a useful heuristic tool for understanding production processes. 
Whereas mainstream economics treat entrepreneurship as a limited phenomenon regarding 
start-up businesses, Austrian economics treat entrepreneurship as a basic trait of the market 
economy; at the core of a larger system and a factor which can help us explain a whole array 
of other phenomena. The constant disequilibrium economy results in opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in search for profits and the economy is brought closer to equilibrium. The 
quicker entrepreneurs can reallocate resources, the closer to equilibrium the economy can 
get. To help himself exercise his judgment and claim possible profits the entrepreneur 
 83 
organizes resources in firms.  When the data entrepreneurs are acting upon is manipulated, 
we get misallocation of resources eventually resulting in an economic downturn. We 
conclude that the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship is a valuable contribution to both fields 
of economics, micro- and macroeconomics.  
Does Austrian theory have implications for how we understand business 
management and the role of public policy? 
We have tried to illuminate how Austrian theory can help managers understanding the 
purpose of management and the specific role of the capitalist-entrepreneur as opposed to 
managers and advisors. We find that Austrian theory can provide an essential understanding 
of management and its purpose.  
Management is an extension of the entrepreneur’s judgment and its purpose is to maximize 
profits by maximizing the share captured of inputs’ DMRP. The different methods for doing 
so is a functional question and Austrian economics cannot give a clear cut answers in such 
cases. However, as we have shown, Austrian economics can provide insights which 
challenge mainstream simplifications of complex phenomena such as vertical integration. 
Also, the Austrian emphasis on economic calculation with established market prices is a 
fundamental insight for business managers. 
Regarding public policy, Austrian economic theory is vehemently opposed to any form of 
intervention. However, we want to take the opportunity to make suggestions for how 
intervention can cause the least damage.  
Market prices as defined by the Austrian school are the basis for economic calculation and 
the rational allocation of resources. Any deviation from the practice of letting profit and loss, 
based on market prices, control the allocation of resources constitutes a loss. Though many 
people might find it preferable to deviate from the market system in particular cases due to 
moral convictions, they should not be allowed to fool themselves and others into believing 
that the economy as a whole is better off.  
There are, of course, situations in which intervention of some form is unavoidable due to the 
lack of complete property rights. In such cases externalities may occur. The important thing 
for government intervention is to deviate as little as possible from what the market price 
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would have been had the property rights been complete. This price, unfortunately, becomes 
mere speculation in any case, but one should at least have a neutral approach when setting it.    
Furthermore, as explained by the Austrian business cycle theory, any steps taken by 
government to prevent the reallocation of both capital and labor will be detrimental to 
economic progress. Entrepreneurs must be free to reallocate their capital, hire and fire 
employees as they see fit, in order for resource allocation to be efficient. Arbitrary meddling 
in private individuals’ affairs also introduces regime uncertainty. Lensink et al. (1999) finds 
a clear negative effect of regime uncertainty on economic performance. Predictability of 
government policy is paramount in reducing uncertainty, especially when the public sector 
might constitute 40-50 % of an economy. 
There is also the risk that government policy can make it more profitable for entrepreneurs to 
devote their efforts and resources into evading taxes instead of meeting consumer wants. We 
contend that a low rate, large base tax system is preferable in this regard.  
The way governments see competition and monopoly should also be revised. The present 
day policy of “you must compete, but are not allowed to win” is a peculiar one, and its basis 
is in normative considerations not economic ones. Instead of fearing monopolies, 
governments should fear their self-imposed barriers to entry (e.g. compliance cost, 
certificates, permits etc.). In any case, the fact that a firm produces less than its absolute 
sustainable level frees up resources to be put to work elsewhere. The notion that somehow 
consumer surplus is preferable to producer surplus reeks of politics rather than economics. 
Furthermore, the whole concept of high price, low output monopolies in the free market is 
one challenged both by history and theory.  
In any case the government should go to great lengths in not giving entrepreneurs false 
signals. This applies to both monetary and fiscal policy. Distortion of market prices must be 
avoided to the highest extent possible.  
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6.2   Further research 
 
Our findings and conclusions beg to be backed up by more hard evidence. This paper has 
been conceived of as a presentation and explanation of the Austrian theory of 
entrepreneurship. In depth analysis of the few phenomena we have touched upon must be the 
subject of further research. However, we find that many of the theories we have elaborated 
on make good subjects for more in depth analysis, both theoretical and empirical. We hope 
our work might inspire others to do so.  
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Appendix 
The following table shows data for figure 1.1 constituting Global Innovation Index (GII) 
scores and Economic Freedom index (EFI) scores. The data is found at 
www.globalinnovationindex.org and www.heritage.org respectively.  
 
The following countries have been left out due to incompleteness of information: Taiwan, 
Macau, St. Lucia, North Korea, Burma, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Haiti, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Cuba.  
Country GII EFI
Hong Kong 59,43 90,1
Singapore 59,41 89,4
Australia 53,07 82,0
Switzerland 66,59 81,6
New Zealand 54,46 81,2
Canada 57,6 80,2
Chile 40,58 78,7
Mauritius 38 76,5
Ireland 57,91 76,2
Denmark 58,34 76,1
Lesotho 26,29 49,5
Ukraine 35,78 49,3
Bolivia 30,48 48,4
Ecuador 32,83 48,0
Angola 23,46 47,7
Uzbekistan 23,87 46,5
Argentina 37,66 44,6
Iran 27,3 40,3
Venezuela 27,25 36,3
Zimbabwe 23,98 35,5
